THE NEW REPUBLIC

Lost Ground in Laos

When the 4,600-man Royal Laotian garrison at Nam Tha "fell" on May 6 before an attacking Communist force numbering at most 2,800, the silence was deafening. The defenders took one look at the North Vietnamese battalions spearheading the Pathet Lao advance and stole away without ado toward the Thai border. While his forces were abandoning northern Laos, the US-sponsored Laotian General, Phoumi Nosavan, was firing desultory verbal salvoes against Communist perfidy from the safety of his Vientiane headquarters. And in Washington, those in the Pentagon who had been responsible for a US investment of $300 million in Phoumi and his Army continued until the last to express vague hopes that the royalists would regroup for a last stand at the Mekong River. As if determined to provide a clear pretext for Communist violation of the tenuous cease-fire, Phoumi had taken some well-advertised steps during March and April to change the military balance at Nam Tha in his favor. Against the explicit advice of the US, he reinforced his garrison with 1,500 paratroopers and redeployed his entire force so that it faced Communist China on an exposed ridge to the east of the town. Though this was less than the "provocative" act the Soviet Union called it, the redeployment did offer Communist Pathet Lao commanders an opportunity for which they had apparently been waiting. The rainy season was only two weeks away and there was still time for a military strike that would give the Communist side preponderant bargaining power in the negotiations leading to a coalition government. It would be of little use to pretend that such a government under neutralist Souvanna Phouma can at this late stage be much more than a cover for US disengagement from Laos. Six months or even two

(Continued on page 3)

May 21, 1962, 25 c

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
LIBRARY
BURLINGTON VT
12-64 K26744 AR11-13-1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

T.R.B. *from Washington*

Executive Power

★ Under the spotlights Gen. Eisenhower's glasses twinkled benevolently and his skin pinked like a slapped baby's. To his press conference he denounced "spending," which was like a minister denouncing sin, and then he warned of Kennedy's "efforts" to increase Executive power.

Kennedy came back from Milwaukee on Sunday to face a deteriorating situation in Laos, strains with de Gaulle and Adenauer, a call from Gov. Rockefeller to be "tough" to Communists, and all his big bills in Congress sizzling up at once like eggs for a short-order cook. Yes, problems have grown and so has Executive power.

The Founding Fathers were so fearful of a monarchy that they divided powers and set Congress to watch the President. There is a built-in inefficiency in the system, which Congress hasn't aided by snarling up procedure, nor political parties by remaining inchoate. Executive power hasn't grown much in Canada or Britain where it is quietly collectivized under the parliamentary system. Where it has grown is where it was always most feared – in the US. It has grown here because of the precautions against it.

In the jet age somebody has to act in Washington, and it's the President. Why does Presidential power increase? For your answer, look at Congress. On Monday the Senate preserved its record of never having broken a filibuster aimed at civil rights, a matter that has come up 10 times since 1938. It said, in effect, it was impotent to help Negroes in the South: "You do it!" the Senate told the President.

This happens all the time; no school bill – the President must try to do something. Congress used to try to write tariff bills; now it hands the job over to the White House, retaining veto power. So it goes. Just to get the pending tax bill thus far the House has taken a year. Congress could sit continuously with no summer recess at all and not get through the necessary bills.

Everybody knows this; it's no secret. The great Presidents were all "strong" Presidents; Eisenhower deliberately set out *not* to be one, Kennedy to be one. The test of a successful President nowadays is what he can squeeze from a reluctant Congress. In a mad world somebody has to fill the Washington power vacuum and the President is tagged increasingly to do it. Is this good? It's better than stagnation, of course, but frankly it bothers us; it just seems to us that the Presidential job is getting too big for one man; getting bigger all the time. It's backbreaking for a young man; for an Eisenhower he just dawdles and golfs.

If we had our way we would have a parliamentary system, which doubtless is impossible; short of that we would try some sort of collectivized Executive, with party responsibility. As to denouncing a President for being "strong" (which is what the GOP plans to do) that's like wanting to swap the twist for the minuet. A good idea, maybe, but late, late.

Votes for Cows

★ The Michigan reapportionment plan is going as we expected. The Supreme Court opened the way for urban dwellers to get a fairer distribution of seats in state legislatures, but conservative beneficiaries of rural domination all over the country are falling back on to secondary positions. In many states they are saying, "Let's apportion seats in the Senate on the basis of cows rather than people!"

After seven months' work in Michigan the Republican-dominated state constitutional convention launched by George Romney has come through with a "cow" proposal: it would apportion seats in the lower House fairly on the basis of population, but in the Senate it would give a weight of 80 percent to population and 20 percent to area. For "area" read cows. What it means is that big rural Republican counties with few people and lots of cows will be given seats in the Senate out of proportion to population. That way they can keep Democratic Detroit under control. If another Mennen Williams comes along proposing a graduated state income tax they (and cows) can veto it. You'll see this device attempted in other states.

The Reserve Lobby

★ The National Guard just didn't like being called up in the Berlin crisis and cries of complaint resounded over the country. Now the Defense Department would like to whittle 33,000 men off the 400,000 National Guard, reduce four of its 27 divisions to brigades and incidentally eliminate 400 or so small company-sized outfits. This seemingly modest proposal has roused indignation from state governors and Congressmen. The National Guard, you see, is not only a citizen-soldier outfit, it is a home town industry jealously watched. How efficient it is as a defense force is in debate but there is no question of its importance to each governor for whom it acts as a prestige-builder and private army. It also brings nice Federal dollars into a lot of towns and communities.

"Send 'Em Back"

★ When we launched our crusade to segregate the Scotch-Irish we could not have imagined the enthusiasm that would greet this natural extension of the White Citizens Council. But we must warn against violence. Oh, a kick, maybe, now and then, or a sharp rap from behind with a Coca-Cola bottle, but never anything *overt*. We have a telegram from Boston: WHAT'YA MEAN SEND EM BACK WHERE THEY COME FROM? LYNCH EM! It is true the provocation was great. The writer reports that a Scotch-Irishman tried to sit next to him on a bus. However, in such cases, unless the SI is a *small* specimen, we suggest calling in the sheriff or the registrar of the local polling place.

There are Non-Celtic Citizens Councils now springing up all over. There is one at Belmont, Mass., and an undergraduate cell at Harvard proposes to re-steal the Stone of Scone and deface it, and then destroy the haggis recipe. We understand Rev. Billy Hargis is toying with membership. Hit the glory trail, Billy!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 146 Number 21 Issue 2481 May 21, 1962*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address. Copyright© 1962, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc. Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Indexed in* Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

THE WEEK

1. Lost Ground in Laos; Texas Rebels; Footnotes to the Week; Those Poor Orphans; Radical Right on TV; Italy's New President

ARTICLES

8. Free Elections vs Fear of Peronism
by James W. Rowe

10. What's Adenauer Up To?
by Terence Prittie

12. The Future of Collective Bargaining
by Harry H. Wellington

16. The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson

17. Inside North Vietnam
by Jean Lacouture

DEPARTMENTS

21. Books *26. Movies* *27. Feiffer*
29. Records *30. Correspondence*

THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Selig S. Harrison, Managing Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
Christopher Jencks, Associate Editor
Mary Newcomb Allen, Research
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:

Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Asher Brynes, Helen Fuller, Frank Getlein B. H. Haggin, Morton H. Halperin, Irving Howe, Sidney Hyman, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann, Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

Lost Ground in Laos

months ago, the coalition envisaged at Geneva and agreed to by 14 nations, including the US and the USSR, might have been constituted with marginal Communist participation and a strong personal position for Souvanna, who might conceivably have marshalled substantial internal support for the political defense of his regime against Communist penetration. But today the terms of an agreement are likely to be much stiffer, if an agreement is possible at all, and the odds for preventing outright Communist takeover have become considerably less promising.

The President might have averted this debacle if he had been willing to risk a showdown with the US-supported Laotian rightist leaders several months ago to force their entry into a coalition by withholding the $19 million monthly US military aid check. His fear apparently was that such a step might have invited a Pathet Lao strike and that this, in turn, would have exposed him to Republican attack for having denied Laos anti-Communist fighting strength. As the events of the past week have shown, however, the Royal Laotian Army represented anti-Communist strength only in the imagination of the Pentagon. In all probability, the withdrawal of military aid would have brought the same change of heart on the part of the Laotian rightists that has been apparent since their rout at Nam Tha; and if it had not, or if the Pathet Lao had broken the cease-fire, the Royal Army would in any case have been no more of an asset than it proved to be last week.

In a dispatch from Vientiane as late as April 24, columnist Joseph Alsop had passionately described the power of the Royal Laotian Army and had paraphrased Uncle Remus in blandly advising the President to let things "segashuate . . . meaning to simmer along or to develop naturally." The thing to do was to leave everything to Phoumi and to desist from pushing him into a coalition. Mr. Alsop was speaking not only for himself but for a surprising number of responsible officials within our government. A notable characteristic of the Washington reaction to the cables from Laos last week was the almost pathetic disbelief apparent in the Pentagon and in certain CIA quarters. Even after the desertion of Nam Tha, the illusion of a strongman would not die. There were bitter sessions within the Administration in which it was seriously argued that the US should "stand by" Phoumi and give up even trying for a coalition.

This persistence of illusion inside of the government long after reality takes hold of most informed outside opinion continues to devitalize US policy in some other parts of Asia. In neighboring South Vietnam, for example, the US now faces the clear necessity for a realistic re-examination of its commitment to the Ngo Dinh

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diem regime. Instead of letting the situation in Saigon "segashuate" to the advantage of the Communist-led National Liberation Front, the President should in our view act decisively now to regroup non-Communist political forces while time remains.

There are two dangerous illusions governing our policy in South Vietnam. One is that Diem cannot safely be replaced so long as the guerrilla war lasts. The other is that the US can treat Laos and Vietnam as two separate and distinct spheres of policy even though the Communist adversary is in both cases identical – North Vietnam.

In our estimation it has been unrealistic to expect that the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in North Vietnam would feel itself under restraints in Laos for long while the US proceeded to establish a military presence in Saigon. Moreover, as we recently argued (*NR*, April 9), this has also been the calculation of Phoumi in stalling on a Laos coalition. Though misjudging the willingness of the US to embroil itself militarily in his behalf – the Marines were dispatched on May 14 to Thailand, not Laos – Phoumi correctly appraised the temper of North Vietnam. The interdependence of our policy in Laos and South Vietnam is if anything more pronounced now than ever before. For no non-Communist political solution in Laos would appear to have much chance of gaining the acquiescence of Hanoi for more than a matter of months if it is not coupled with evidence of a new US approach to South Vietnam.

There has been much heroic talk in Washington since Nam Tha concerning the ability of the US to carry forward its existing strategy in South Vietnam regardless of the outcome in Laos. It has been contended that control of the Laotian corridor linking North and South Vietnam need not prove decisive after all. But if the corridor is, even now, the channel for heavy arms traffic to the Viet Cong, it would seem inescapable that increasing Communist power in Laos would naturally mean stepped-up outside aid for the guerrillas.

Analyzing the North Vietnam leadership in this issue, Jean Lacouture of *Le Monde* sketches the cleavage between the pro-Chinese group of the Lao Dong Party led by Truong Chinh and the presently dominant Vietnamese "nationalist" faction of Ho Chi Minh. Whatever the threat posed by North Vietnam today, the rise of a militant Chinese satellite regime would present a still greater long-run danger to South Vietnam and would automatically convert the US engagement in Saigon into a commitment potentially engaging Peking. There are dangers in any course now followed by the US. But while one can see nothing to gain from a policy calculated to encourage the pro-Chinese faction, there is the possibility, at least, of fostering nationalist and "moderate" tendencies within North Vietnam Communism through exploring a limited *modus vivendi* with the present Hanoi regime.

The key to temporary stabilization in Laos and South Vietnam might lie in the North Vietnam food shortage. While holding fast against the demands of Hanoi for cultural and other contacts which would only serve to bolster the National Liberation Front in Saigon, the South might profitably consider a government-to-government arrangement reopening the pre-partition rice trade with the North as the price of legalizing the continued division of Vietnam for a specified period – perhaps five years. At the end of some such period the nationalist forces of the South might be able to hold their own in an internationally established Vietnamese confederation or possibly a larger grouping of the sort outlined in these pages (*NR*, April 9).

Will the South be better situated to drive such a bargain in one or two or three years than it is today?

The Kennedy Administration reasons that the counter-guerrilla program being carried out by the Diem regime and the US Military Assistance Command will have its payoff as the "strategic villages" are gradually fortified and manned during the coming year. Then, one hears it argued, the South would be able to bargain with Hanoi from a position of strength. This might be a realistic rationale for continuing support to Diem indefinitely were it not for the profound uneasiness apparent among the great majority of politically activated Vietnamese both in Saigon and in most provincial towns. A serious effort to arrest the erosion of non-Communist forces presupposes that Diem be succeeded by a National Council formed of Army officers, bureaucrats and popularly esteemed political figures.

An example of dynamic successor leadership is the anti-Communist, radical nationalist Nguyen Ngoc Bich. Now living in Paris, Mr. Bich is widely known in Cochin China for his exploits as a senior commander with the Vietminh forces in the war against the French. His nationalist reputation is unsullied by past ties with Diem or the Communists.

Outlining his proposals for a possible accommodation with Hanoi in the current *China Quarterly*, published in London, Bich interprets the pressure of North Vietnam on the South largely in terms of its need for rice and suggests the desirability both of reopening trade as well as of enunciating "a more truly national and independent foreign policy" in Saigon. When this journal asked him last week what he means by an independent nationalist foreign policy, his response had the ring of one who could stand his ground in give and take with Hanoi. If the North would admit Western ambassadors, then let Saigon recognize the USSR and China. But "let us not put ourselves in an inferior position. For us, neutrality is a global problem. If the North does not accept neutralization, let us not deprive ourselves of the protection of our friends."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Texas Rebels

Now that President Kennedy has said that he can have a place on the ticket again in 1964 if he wants it, it will be interesting to see how Lyndon Johnson uses the prestige granted him – particularly in his own state of Texas. The Vice President is obviously running for the 1968 Presidential nomination, and it is equally obvious to him that any demonstrable show of disloyalty to the President would trip him up.

His critics have tried to foster the image of such a demonstration in the June 3 Texas gubernatorial primary, where Johnson's long-time political aide and former Secretary of the Navy, John Connally, is opposing a young Houston lawyer named Don Yarborough. Yarborough, in addition to pledging repeal of the sales tax, improved state services and an increase in the days each month Texas oil wells may operate, has proclaimed himself an all-out Kennedy Democrat.

Though many liberal Democrats and labor leaders in Texas concede privately that they aren't sure what they would get if they got young Yarborough elected, they will give no quarter to Connally against their own man. They regard Connally as a genuine threat to the long-overdue development of an honest two-party system in the state. He has put together a coalition that reaches from the *Dallas News* on the Right to some Negro and civil rights groups on the Left and will use it, as one critic said, "to play the same damned no-party, no-issue politics Lyndon has always played."

But this argument has not impressed White House pragmatists, who can see no treachery in the Johnson-Connally operation. As indicated by their own indifference to the malodorous conditions in successive Massachusetts state administrations, the Kennedys don't put too much value on the ideology or even the honesty of a Governor, so long as he doesn't make trouble for them when they run. They have been told Connally is more certain to defeat the Republican nominee, Jack Cox, than Yarborough would be, and that's that. Connally's disagreements with Kennedy policy (like the late Speaker Rayburn, he opposes federal aid to education and has some doubts about social security financing of medical benefits) do not give White House politicians sleepless nights; the President can have a little talk with Connally about these matters.

What does concern the White House, however, are the voting habits of the big Texas delegation in the House. Last session, only eight of the 21 Texans (including Mr. Rayburn) voted with the President as often as the average Democratic Congressman. In at least three Democratic Congressional primaries last year and this, Johnson men have been working for the conservative candidates and against men who would have been with the Kennedy forces on the "tough" roll calls. When

Footnotes *to the* Week

THE SLOGAN of an independent nuclear deterrent for NATO tends to have an attractive ring in many European ears. Under analysis its persuasiveness fades. It is inconceivable that a NATO nuclear force could be so large as to be usable out of phase with the nuclear resources of the United States. The notion of ever employing a marginal NATO capability independently of the US and of operating with uncoordinated targeting policies raises a nightmare. A NATO nuclear force might work out as an adjunct, but not on a basis of operational autonomy. These were the truths borne in upon our European allies by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Athens ministerial session of the NATO Council. —— THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY PROGRAM *is shot through with fraud, judging from samplings taken by investigators in a number of states. This has prompted the Justice Department to ask for legislation empowering it to intervene directly where it presently cannot reach state officials and contractors who misapply federal highway funds (which finance 90 percent of program costs).* —— AID TO INDIA might be cut by $270 million if the Senate Foreign Relations Committee fails to reverse an 8-7 vote on an amendment introduced by Stuart Symington (D., Mo.). Two members of the Committee, Albert Gore (D., Tenn.) and Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.), were not present for the initial vote on May 11. —— THE BONN *government's recall of its Washington ambassador, Wilhelm Grewe, was sudden. The envoy did not know about it until he heard it announced on a news broadcast.* —— DEFENSE SPENDING is running at about $4 billion a month, the highest actual dollar outflow since Korea. By late next year it will rise above $50 billion a year and stay there indefinitely. —— WAGE RESTRAINT: *The next test of Administration wage restraint policies will be in critical aerospace negotiations. UAW and IAM demands are considered to be in excess of the three percent formula. Secretary of Labor Goldberg, in his speech to the Auto Workers convention, offered the parties a way out when he said that the Administration would consider a "modern" as well as a "fair and reasonable" settlement non-inflationary. The unions have charged that the industry has lagged behind others by failing to provide for union security and supplementary unemployment benefits in labor contracts.* —— LETTERS to the White House, the State Department, and AID headquarters on whether to include technical information on birth control in US economic assistance programs are on an increase. More than nine-tenths are favorable. A check showed about 75 percent came from individuals listed in *Who's Who.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Connally's State House control of party machinery is added to Johnson's immense influence from Washington, the White House will expect steps to be taken to bring the Texas delegation more in line – or to replace those who are chronic defectors.

The Kennedy operatives will also be watching the 1964 Senate primary, where Sen. Ralph Yarborough, a long-time irritant to Johnson and Connally but a pretty regular backer of the President's bills, will be seeking renomination. Opposition to Ralph Yarborough would be viewed as a serious act of disloyalty to the Chief.

Those Poor Orphans

Sparked principally by savings and loan associations (who, as the President has pointed out, enjoy some special tax privileges of their own), a propaganda campaign to beat down the administration's dividend-interest withholding tax proposal is being carried out across the country in full-page newspaper advertisements and in letters urging depositors and savers to write their Representatives, "preferably in your own handwriting." $600 million in federal revenue rides on the outcome. The associations are alarmed because the new provision will require them to do some additional paper work in order to withhold taxes from interest payments to their depositors.

A full-page ad in the *Lima* (Ohio) *Citizen* of March 9, sponsored by a group of local credit institutions, states that the withholding proposal "means that churches, synagogues, orphanages, union trust funds, hospitals, all charitable organizations, widows, pensioners and even little children must file complicated tax forms to obtain refunds. Can you imagine the red tape involved in getting a 50-cent tax refund for a two-year-old child? . . . The aged, blind, or indigent earning less than necessary to pay income tax will have to wait months or perhaps a year to get refunds. Meanwhile, who buys the groceries . . .?"

Insofar as charitable organizations are concerned, the Administration proposes to exempt them from withholding by statute. The "widow-orphan" lament, heard 11 years ago when Sen. Paul Douglas proposed a withholding scheme, is plain phony. First of all, more than 80 percent of dividend and interest recipients earn more than $10,000 a year (hardly "indigents"). Second, those widows, children, orphans, etc., whose income is too low to be taxed can, under the proposed tax bill, have an exemption certificate filed with a bank or corporation and thus be spared any withholding.

Moreover, hand-wringing about dividend or interest recipients whose taxes may be over-withheld (despite the exemption procedure) and who may have to file for a tax refund ignores the fact that wage earners have had their taxes withheld. And, unlike the dividend and interest receivers, they do not fall largely in the over-$10,000 group. Some 38 million wage earners have their taxes over-withheld and depend on the government to send refunds which Internal Revenue is able to do within 45 days of the tax-filing deadline.

"Interest and dividends are a reward for thrift, an incentive to invest in a growing America," says a Pennsylvania newspaper advertisement: "To withhold them in advance reduces the incentive to save or invest." If this were true, the existing wage withholding should be abandoned as a disincentive to work.

Senator Douglas has received 30,000 letters in a two-week period, almost all of them anti-withholding; his colleague, Senator Dirksen, reported receiving some 40,000 letters. Another Senate staff aide reports the withholding mail is "the heaviest in my experience on the Hill." It shows that many are unaware that dividend and interest income is taxable, and have not been including it on their returns.

Radical Right on TV

I have a series . . . THE RED REPORT *. . . designed to alert the American people to the "Communist criminal conspiracy" . . . Remember, "Better brave than slave," that's my purpose and with* THE RED REPORT *it can be your public service campaign. . . .* – Herbert A. Philbrick *in an "open letter" to local TV stations*

Philbrick is not the only one, nor does the above ad which appeared in *Broadcasting* magazine state the ex-FBI agent's only purpose; his other is to cash in on what the *Insider's Newsletter* terms as the "Hottest commodity on the mass-media market" – Anti Communism.

The broadcasters, who usually see things realistically, are aware that Communist Party membership totals only about 10,000. Subtract undercover FBI members and that reduces the number substantially. Here then, they must realize, is the group which can be safely offended. "You don't have to be objective about narcotics, morals or Communism," according to W. P. Strube, Jr., the Texas insurance executive who doubles as director of Radio-TV for Dr. Fred Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communist Crusade panels, discussions, and sermons "designed to alert us."

Not only is anti-Communism a "safe" controversy, it offers two extra bonuses:

1. It's popular. The Radical Right is making political hay, especially in the South, Southwest and Midwest, out of alleged internal Communist subversion. (A recent poll by Republican Senator Young of North Dakota revealed that almost 90 percent of his constituents thought the internal Communist threat greater than the military power of the Soviet Union.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. It's lucrative. Much of the material will be written, produced and sponsored by the Radical Right and its more affluent adherents – though in locales where Rev. Billy Hargis' Christian Crusade shows strength, stations are urged to carry his programs *gratis*.

There are at least 250 individual anti-Communist shows, including five complete series, being readied for airing by local stations during the upcoming season beginning in September. Southwestern oil and utility interests have rushed forward to underwrite production costs nationally, and sponsorship locally.

One series, *Communism: Worldwide*, a 26-week half-hour program consisting of film clips joined by the foreboding narrative tones of Hearst columnist Bob Considine, is being financed, according to Joseph Mawra, president of the production firm of B. F. Nielson Associates, by businessmen whom he mysteriously refuses to identify any further than as prominent oil figures. US Video, another producing outfit, will offer a weekly series titled *Counterchallenge – Program for Victory*, consisting, in part, of a panel featuring as a regular member that ardent apologist for McCarthyism, *Reader's Digest* Senior Editor, Eugene S. Lyons. Since US Video is headed by Hardy Burt, oil billionaire H. L. Hunt's alter-ether-ego of *Facts Forum* radio days, it seems a reasonable hunch that Hunt money may be putting up some of the cash for *Counterchallenge*. Regionally and locally, we've already seen a sample of the money available to pay for such fare. The three-hour tape of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade's *Hollywood's Answer to Communism* was sponsored on 35 Far and Southwest stations by Richfield Oil.

The entry of the Radical Right into local TV would be a welcome antidote to bland broadcasting, providing that the "other side" – either civil libertarians whose ideas of how freedom can best be defended differ from those of the professional anti-Communists, or liberals who would like to convince their audience that they aren't the same as Communists – was also given the opportunity to be seen and heard. There should be no question of time for "the other side," since the Federal Communications Act "requires that licensees devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues . . . and that such programs be designed *so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions*. . . ."

But the matter is complicated by the fact that broadcasting stations are specifically exempted from common carrier status. This means that no one (except *bona fide* political candidates) has a right to equal time to present an opposing view. All the Commission says it expects of a broadcaster when he covers controversial questions is that "he exercise his best judgment and good sense in determining . . . the different shades of opinion to be presented. . . ." No other guideline is laid down. When those on one side of an issue have their programs already canned on film or tape and ready for broadcast, *and* the money to pay for the time to present them, can (or should) stations be expected to give relatively penurious dissenters equal time to reply?

It is the Radical Right's relative affluence, then, which must be considered. Technicolor and Schick paid for three hours of time on New York's WPIX to present the Hollywood Crusade special. (Patrick Frawley, Jr., Chairman of the Southern California School of Anti-Communism, is president of Schick and on Technicolor's board). When Gilbert Seldes asked the station to carry an hour-and-a-half taped reply in which he had participated, produced by and for presentation on a fair-minded Far West three-station chain that had carried the original Hollywood production under Richfield sponsorship, WPIX refused.

The issue is now on the FCC's doorstep. The American Civil Liberties Union laid it there when it filed a formal protest over WPIX's refusal to grant equal time. There are at least two choices before the Commission: It could issue a statement noting that since the paramount consideration is the station's obligation to present a balanced picture, it is irrelevant that one side may seem to have an advantage if it can present at no cost what the other side had to pay for; or, it could eliminate this economic dilemma entirely by ruling that programs which deal with controversial issues constitute a category of public service which may not be sponsored at all.

Italy's New President

The new President of Italy, Antonio Segni, was the candidate of the moderate and conservative Christian-Democrats who continued to back him even after it became evident that he could reach the required majority only with the votes of the Neo-Fascists. They spurned all offers of compromise from the Social Democrats, Republicans, and Nenni Socialists, which, together with the Christian-Democrats themselves, make up the majority supporting the present left-of-center Fanfani government. The result was a direct clash between a pro-Segni conservative alignment extending all the way to the extreme Right, and a leftist alignment extending all the way to the Communists. The latter backed the candidacy of Giuseppe Saragat, leader of the pro-Western Social Democrats.

The circumstances attending Segni's election have badly shaken the left-of-center majority; and the jolt has come at the very time when this majority is called upon to prove before the next election, by the spring of 1963, its ability to move forward along the rocky road to social reform and institutional modernization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DEMOCRATIC GAMBLE THAT FAILED IN ARGENTINA

Free Elections *vs* Fear of Peronism

Buenos Aires

As the Argentine polls closed at six on the sultry Sunday afternoon of March 18, Dr. Guillermo Acuna Anzorena, 41-year-old candidate of the Frondizi-led *Union Civica Radical Intransigente* (UCRI) for Governor of Buenos Aires province, entered his campaign headquarters in a dingy side street of the national capital. He was exhausted at the end of a gruelling nine month struggle to win the state house of Argentina's largest, richest, and most important province, during the course of which he had exhorted the electors to forget past divisions and hatreds, to join in a campaign "hand in hand with all the neighbors" and to allow him and his "forces of youth" to build part of a new Argentina on the foundations of social peace, legality and economic development.

Though the UCRI in Buenos Aires had counted less votes in the 1960 Congressional elections than those of the opposition *Union Civica Radical del Pueblo* (UCRP), or the blank ballots cast by the Peronists, and though one of the capital's newspapers had published an eleventh-hour poll which showed formidable Peronist strength in the province, Acuna and his followers felt they had cause to be optimistic. They counted among their advantages the creditable record of incumbent UCRI Governor Alende, the strong, costly, and well-directed campaign which Acuna had waged, and the supposed confusion among the followers of former Dictator Juan Peron, whose ranks were believed to be divided until the last moment between those who welcomed the first opportunity since 1954 to participate in the electoral process and those who dreaded the consequences of such a test.

Around 6:20 an aide manning a telephone nearby rushed in to congratulate Acuna on the first returns from Mercedes, his home town, where the UCRI was leading the UCRP by 192 votes to 87. It was less than ten minutes later when State Congressman Ideler Tonelli, who had managed Acuna's campaign, stepped into an outer room full of waiting newsmen and announced, "Gentlemen, we have lost the election. Peronism has beaten us in Buenos Aires. Get this, we've even lost in Juarez, where the top Peronist boss has been working for us." With a stunned and bitter grimace he added, "They've slaughtered us; the margin is overwhelming."

With this candid concession came the swift tumbling of hopes and confidence of a substantial sector of Buenos Aires' middle-sector political leadership that believed the time had come to bury the passions of 1955 and to campaign on the issues of 1962 rather than on Peronism versus anti-Peronism. Frondizi's Radicals hesitantly had staked everything on their ability to consolidate a broadly-based, middle-of-the-road party by opening the door of political participation to roughly one-third of the electorate which had remained isolated during six years of the "limited democracy" doctrine officially adopted by the Revolution of Liberation after Peron's overthrow in 1955. Theirs proved to be a massive miscalculation: in the province, Acuna's 764,000 vote total slightly surpassed that of the bereft UCRP, but was dwarfed by the 1,197,000 ballots received by Peronist candidate Andres Framini.

What was happening in Buenos Aires was being repeated throughout most of Argentina, where eight million voters had gone to the polls to select governors in 14 provinces, as well as one-half of the Chamber of Deputies and local officials. In elections which were as free and quiet as any in the nation's history, the Peronists and their allies captured 11 provinces and title to 47 seats in the 192 member Chamber of Deputies scheduled to convene May 1. Polling over 25 million votes nationwide, the Peronist *Frente Justicialista* remained a minority party with less than 34 percent of the total vote, but was considerably ahead of Frondizi's UCRI which received just over two million, and the UCRP with its 1.7 million. A paradoxical and divided nation which has wavered most of this century between constitutionalism and "tropical politics" had opened its ballot boxes to all. When the verdict showed that the government had lost its gamble, it set in motion a crisis which gathered momentum throughout 11 days. At its climax the military Commanders-in-chief deposed Arturo Frondizi, who like Presidents Hipolito Irigoyen and Juan Peron before him, became an involuntary guest on the island naval base of Martin Garcia; the acting President of the Senate, Jose Maria Guido took over the Presidency; on April 23 the election was annulled and the Peronistas outlawed; and new elections were announced for October 27, 1963. Argentina became the latest backslider in Latin America's unsteady quest for political maturity.

Despite the great surprise registered here and abroad at the results and stormy aftermath of the election,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both were consistent with the basic division of power and political style that have prevailed in post-Peron Argentina. Peronist votes accounted for 24 percent of the total in the 1957 constituent elections, 25 percent in the 1960 Congressional contest and advanced to around 34 percent this year. But even in provinces such as Buenos Aires, the significant fact is not that Peronist strength increased but that its hard core persists after six years.

Peronism, after its leader was toppled in 1955, was in quite a different position from vanquished Nazism or Fascism, with which it is so often compared. Its ideology, *justicialismo*, was largely devoid of intellectual content, designed largely to justify one-man rule. Peronism set class against class, and gave a new industrial proletariat a bigger slice of income as well as a sense of participation in national life, but it did not effect any revolutionary restructuring of the nation, not even land reform. In the end it was vanquished by a military coup d'etat which had popular support. Peronism was never a revolutionary totalitarianism which gambled everything on an all-out struggle with foreign or domestic enemies and lost. In consequence it was dislodged but never totally discredited.

Unlike denazification in postwar Germany "de-Peronization" quickly became a major political issue. Attitudes toward ex-Peronists swung like a pendulum from the moderate policies of General Eduardo Lonardi's brief provisional government to a vigorous eradication program during the term of Provisional President Pedro Aramburu (1955-1958) and back again with the appeasement strategy of Frondizi's Presidential campaign.

Benefiting greatly from the quarrels among their divided successors and firmly entrenched in the trade unions, Peronists bided their time. In 1958 they played the role of *gran elector*, swinging 1.8 million votes to Frondizi's party and permitting it to gain the Presidency and a majority in Congress. Their rewards came in legislation providing general amnesty for most of their leaders and a labor law which favored Peronists over their opponents but stopped short of removing the ban on the *Justicialista* Party or granting amnesty to Peron himself. But after Frondizi reversed his economic policies abruptly in 1958, Peronists reacted vigorously with bombs, strikes and terrorist activity in which they collaborated with Argentina's small Communist group. The government then turned to the Armed Forces. Violence was crushed with the help of troops, military courts, intervention of key trade unions and the banning of the Communist Party. Peronists turned again to voting blank ballots in the 1960 elections, as they had in 1957. Meanwhile no great national figure had emerged from the Peronist ranks, leadership being divided between professional politicians and trade union directors with the latter controlling the movement's best machinery.

The bitterest foes of the Peronists were among Argentina's Armed Forces, which haven't fought a war since 1878, and out of whose own proud ranks came Army Colonel Juan D. Peron. Many of the senior officers in the three services share a deep conviction that the Armed Forces are guardians of the constitutional order and supreme arbiter of the national destiny. Although they do not wish to exercise governmental authority directly, they hold it their duty to set certain limits within which political activity may take place. These limits exclude any return of Peronism.

By no means all of the political-minded officers are content, however, with the role of constitution-guarding. Both the extreme anti-Peronist "gorillas" and younger Army officers who are violently anti-Communist, have wanted to exercise more control over their own commanders and over broad governmental policies. To this end some of them have organized themselves into secret "lodges" with such unlikely names as "Green Dragons" from which they emit unsigned memoranda which mix metaphysics and allegations of sinister plots against the nation in a kind of Argentine version of a John Birch Society Tract. Inter-service rivalry often permitted the President to contain the military; but where the services were united as in demanding the rupture with Cuba after Punta del Este they have contained the President.

Conclusions To Be Drawn

However clouded the future may be, the 11 days March 18-29 offer important clues about Argentine politics and permit some tentative conclusions about this richest Latin American country which many had hoped would become the showcase of the Alliance for Progress – a country which boasts a temperate climate, 150 years of independence, a literacy rate approaching 90 percent, a racially homogeneous population and a real middle class.

1. President Frondizi's ouster and exile was perhaps as reluctant a *coup* as can be found in the unlovely annals of Latin American *golpismo*. Neither the top military leaders nor Vice President Guido wanted to take over the government. United only on the single point that Peronism could not be allowed to return to power, a majority of the Armed Forces chiefs were willing, almost until the last, to accept a solution which would permit Frondizi to remain in office, provided other non-Peronist groups would agree. Even when General Aramburu's findings indicated that such a solution was impossible, the military repeatedly requested Frondizi's resignation so that constitutional succession could take place. Yet it was a *coup* that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

removed the President, and Argentines who now deny it do little justice to the facts.

2. Frondizi's complete alienation of political groups outside his own party proved decisive. There were three critical moments: first, when "polarization" of the non-Peronist vote failed to occur; second, when other parties refused to join with him in a union cabinet; finally when center and conservative leadership accepted his illegal removal as the lesser of two evils.

3. The crisis and the campaign which preceded it shed a great deal of light on the nature of Frondizi's politics. Discarding the right-wing theory that he was all along the Communist wolf in liberal fleece, one may conclude in fairness that he placed too much hope in the capacity of economic progress to heal all of Argentina's political ulcers. Always bidding for time in the sure trust that gushing oil wells, burgeoning production and better distribution of Argentina's potential abundance would justify him in the end, the adroit President perilously skirted the frontiers of political dishonesty and ideological fraud. With each of the many crises he surmounted, he seems to have gained not only an increased confidence in his tactical skill, but a near-mystical faith that he and his party represented the general will of 20 million Argentines. In the political "testament" left to his party leaders after his deposition he spoke of those who opposed him as "enemies of the Nation and people." By denying the limited opposition its due place, he encouraged that opposition to become unlimited. Frondizi's final and hopeless decision not to resign must be seen against this background.

4. The United States acquitted itself creditably in its marginal but inevitable role. Given the degree of US involvement in Latin America and the Latin's frequent readiness to blame the Yankee for domestic problems, some criticism was to be expected. Peronists, along with their Communist and Vanguardia-Socialist collaborators complain the loudest, arguing that there is a secret alliance between the Pentagon and the Argentine military "gorillas," and that President Kennedy is hoodwinked by the generals of *El Pentagono* who promote a myopic anti-Communism in South America by inviting officers to the United States for insidious special instruction.

In some circles there were complaints that the $150 million Alliance for Progress loan announced a week before the election was an open attempt to influence its outcome, and that US Ambassador Robert McClintock's call on President Frondizi during the third day of the crisis was of questionable propriety. Even within Frondizi's party some leaders are now complaining that the government's policy of friendship with the United States cost the party votes. But thus far the criticism has been haphazard and unconvincing. The US position of diplomatic silence and prudent waiting has proved wise.

The forecast is not all bleak. There is a pervasive regard for legality. The near-universal sense of shame which permeated proud Argentina during the crisis may in the end have a recuperative power of great value. Democracy is not dead here, though the democrats will certainly have to stand closer together than they have if they expect to survive Peronism on one flank and military meddling on the other.

JAMES W. ROWE

HIS SWIPE AT NEGOTIATIONS WAS ALMOST FRIVOLOUS

What's Adenauer Up To?

Bonn

By announcing, with a simulation of near-boredom, that he held out no hope of success from the American-Soviet talks on Berlin, and that his government would not wish to collaborate in an international authority supervising Berlin's communications with the West, Dr. Adenauer has put his Christian Democratic cat well and truly among the White House pigeons and the Kremlin's stuffed white doves. The Chancellor made his statement before the German and foreign press on May 7, at a press conference in West Berlin from which nothing more than professions of Western solidarity and assurances of further material aid for the city had been expected.

What Dr. Adenauer said was deeply pessimistic, although he began his visit to West Berlin on the same morning by stating that the world situation was more favorable than for some time past, and attributing this alleged improvement to the political and military agreement reached among participants at the NATO conference in Athens which had just finished. He said

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it would be better if both German states stayed out of an international body of the kind envisaged by Mr. Rusk to control Berlin's communications, since the presence of an East German delegation would imply some measure of recognition of the East German regime. Dr. Adenauer added that he did not think an international authority of 13 members would be workable. For the five Western and five Communist members would vote as "blocs," so leaving all real responsibility to the three neutrals – Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden. He did not believe that the three neutrals would relish this position.

Finally, he repeated his most operative thought – that the American-Soviet talks are doomed to failure and will not lead to constructive East-West negotiations over Berlin. Once more, the Chancellor spoke with an easy insouciance; it evidently did not occur to him that his somewhat disjointed remarks struck at the roots of the whole American effort to lessen tension over Berlin by securing a *modus vivendi* which would include a clear guarantee of non-interference with Berlin's terribly vulnerable communications.

The first point to be clarified about these – on the face of it – astonishing remarks is how they came to be made.

Up to May 5, Adenauer had been away from Bonn for nearly six weeks. During that time he paid one flying visit to Bonn, and received one visit in return from his Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroeder. The latter went on to Athens, where he appeared to have reached an ample measure of understanding with Secretary Rusk. Granted, this impression may be illusory; what is sure is that Schroeder left the Athens conference in a great hurry, in order to be back in time to have a long talk with Adenauer before the latter left for Berlin.

At exactly the same time that Schroeder was on his way from Athens, the former Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, was hurrying to the Chancellor's home at Rhoendorf from Washington, where he had seen President Kennedy and a number of Senators. Brentano has made no secret of his strong opposition to compromises on Berlin which entail any sort of recognition of the East German regime. He reached the Chancellor before Schroeder did, and at once had a long and highly private talk with him. It is not only probable that Brentano convinced Adenauer that the *status quo* in Berlin was preferable to realization of the Rusk plan; somehow he managed to misinform him about the state of American opinion. Adenauer was able to announce later that Brentano had explained that the sense of trust felt in the United States toward the Federal Republic was as great as ever, and that there was full sympathy in America for the West German position concerning all of the key issues.

Now, the Chancellor has been largely out of touch with political issues since March. During the last half year he has grown noticeably older and frailer. He has always had a tendency to inflexibility, and a process of mental hardening of the arteries may well be accelerating. Yet Adenauer's apparent readiness to torpedo the Rusk proposals on Berlin may stem, essentially, from the fact that the policy which Brentano expounded to him used to be his very own. While registering no sign of disapproval of the American-Soviet exploratory talks, it is perfectly possible that Adenauer has all along had little confidence in them. For they have cut radically across his old and somewhat stale concept of "standing firm" over Berlin, and his insisting with a wooden pertinacity and singlemindedness that the only solution of the Berlin question is the city's reestablishment as capital of a reunified (and democratic) Germany.

The Innocent Suffer

The truth is that not only the Chancellor and his Ministers but the West Germans as a whole have been subjected to a considerable psychological strain by the American-Soviet talks. It is too easily forgotten abroad that all West Germans – no matter what their shade of political opinion – regard the Ulbricht regime as illegal and tyrannical. They tend to look on any agreement which tacitly accepts the existence of that regime as a step away from a fair solution of the German problem as a whole, as unwise and retrograde. During the last few weeks, in his ivory tower on the shores of Lake Como, Adenauer has been shrinking from a course of action which might label him, to future generations, as the man who signed away the German birthright of unity, in freedom.

What will be the immediate consequences of his Berlin statement? The first, paradoxically enough, has been the recall of the West German Ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Grewe, who has been one of the foremost exponents of the Chancellor's outdated but now refurbished policy of Maginot-maintenance of the *status quo*. The withdrawal of Grewe is a mere gesture, designed to divert attention from West German opposition to the Rusk probes. Adenauer himself said in Berlin that it was sometimes necessary for the "innocent" to suffer and expressed his appreciation of Grewe's work.

In a parliamentary democracy of longer standing, the resignation of the luckless Schroeder, who has been fulfilling one policy while his Chancellor has been turning to another, would be the next consequence. Adenauer has a curious disregard for the personal prestige of the men who serve him loyally. It has probably not occurred to him that he has done Schroe-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

der, who could well be his candidate for the Chancellorship when he himself retires next year, considerable harm. It is at least sure that he will strive to keep him in office, for Schroeder's resignation would underline the disunity in the Christian Democratic Party which Adenauer is determined to paper over.

The loss of confidence in Adenauer which will presumably take place in the United States is a matter for comment by informed opinion in Washington rather than Bonn. It is a risk which Adenauer seems to have taken in a mood of singular frivolousness. For whatever the rights and wrongs of his present views, he allowed the American-Soviet talks to drag over a four-month period without attempting to make his views plain. There will be a corresponding loss of confidence in Adenauer in Britain, and his action will certainly rearouse some of the bitter anti-German feeling which is so industriously nurtured by papers like the *New Statesman* and *Daily Express*.

All in all, Adenauer has struck a damaging blow at that Western unity of aim and action which he has always preached in the past. The true culprit may be Brentano, the Foreign Minister whom Adenauer himself dropped last November on the insistence of his Free Democratic allies.

In any case, it would be desperately unfair if a scapegoat were made of Schroeder, who has tried so hard to bridge American-German differences in tactics and concepts. In the long run the main sufferers will be the Christian Democratic Party and the now bewildered West German electorate. And the Berlin question, after months of tortuous discussion, has been thrown back into the melting-pot.

Terence Prittie

The Future of Collective Bargaining

by Harry H. Wellington

In a Chicago address to the officers and directors of the Executives Club on February 23, the Secretary of Labor produced perhaps the fullest public statement we have of the government's position on labor-management relations. Extracting from the report of the Council of Economic Advisers the goals for President Kennedy's labor policy, Secretary Goldberg said: "We want to prevent inflation and maintain price stability. We want to increase productivity in our country so that labor, management and the public can all rightfully share in the fruits of profits. And when we talk about productivity increases I want to make one thing clear, that this is a sharing proposition. No one participant is entitled to hog all the results of productivity. It has got to be shared between all. In order to remain competitive in world markets we want to step up the rate of economic growth in our country. This is vitally necessary if we are to achieve reasonably full employment, if we are to maintain stability in our federal budget, and if we are to meet our defense needs and our international needs."

Then Mr. Goldberg announced how the Administration intends to see to it that these goals are realized. "I think," he said, "that the government should do more statistical and economic analyses so that people can be advised of the relevant facts before they settle [labor disputes] and not after. This seems to me an obvious function of government which is the impartial agency engaged in fact finding. . . . I think government has the obligation to define the national interest and assert it when it reaches important proportions in any area of our economy. And I would like to state this is what your government is going to do. It is going to unhesitatingly assert and define the national interest because after all we regard this to be our obligation to all of the people. But we are only going to do that to make sure that the government defines what the government can do, that the government does not do what the government cannot do, and that is entering into the collective bargaining situation as a party who is involved in what the real parties themselves ought to do. The government ought to act as the government and not replace the parties or their responsibility in collective bargaining."

Secretary Goldberg's seemingly mild words produced a strong and harmonious reaction from spokesmen of labor and management. "Keep collective bargaining free," was the slogan each side reached for and found. It is the characteristic response of interested parties committed to the *status quo*.

Labor-management opposition to the Administration's policy was probably not directed to the general aims articulated by the Secretary. There may be individuals who favor a little inflation and who care very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little about economic growth or full employment. Happily they speak softly and carry no sticks. However, the Administration's goals (and the important one, so far as collective bargaining is concerned, is the non-inflationary settlement) are goals of national economic policy. On the other hand, the methods for achieving the goals, sketched by the Secretary in his speech and detailed by the President in the actions he took during the steel negotiations and in his response to the steel price rise, are methods directed toward the individual plant, firm or industry. This is the great challenge: How to apply national economic policy at the plant, firm or industry level without turning over wage and price decisions to the government. The specter of this turnover generated the fear that filled the hearts of labor and management spokesmen when they read the words of Mr. Goldberg in their newspapers.

Of course, there are many kinds of government involvement in collective bargaining. What the Secretary said and what the President put into practice in the steel drama is not the same as price and wage setting by the government; nor is it the same as compulsory arbitration. But it is more government involvement, and the Administration must face up to it. The President's labor policy makes wage and price determination less free than it was before. President Kennedy concluded that this unhappy sacrifice is one that must be made if we are to compete and survive. His judgment is based on an admixture of domestic and international economic and political considerations. I, for one, do not know whether the President is wise or unwise in this judgment. Too many of the considerations that go to make up the judgment are now known only within the councils of the Administration.

Accordingly, for the purposes of this discussion, I accept as wise the President's decision to involve the government more than it has been in collective bargaining; the dispute is over methods. It is appropriate, however, to pause and notice why any kind of additional government involvement is at a cost. And make no mistake about it, it is. It entails a sacrifice not only for the men of labor and management whose personal power is diminished, it entails the sacrifice of an ideal that has utility for all of us. It is a sacrifice that results in a diminution of private power and an accretion of governmental power. Too much of this can harm a democracy which depends for its strength on the diffusion of power.

The first difficulty I have with the Kennedy-Goldberg methods for achieving the Administration's goals in the labor-management area can be simply stated: Every high union officer and every high corporate official represents a constituency. In this sense he is a lesser but no less a political figure than the President himself. A union leader represents employees in the collective bargaining process. His office imposes an obligation and a trust upon him to represent these employees to the best of his ability. If he is to discharge this obligation, employee interest must be paramount in every official act he takes. In a healthy union, the political process within the organization imposes a constant pressure on the union leader to do what is best for his people. If he fails, he may not be reelected.

The corporate executive too, in the structure of the corporate institution, owes his loyalty to the corporation. Unquestionably his obligation is to act for the benefit of the corporation. His tenure in office may well depend on the way in which he fulfills this trust.

Responsible to Whom?

Is there any real reason to suppose that a wage or price decision that discharges the corporate executive's or the union leader's obligation to his constituency will at all times be a decision that the Administration takes to be in the best interest of the nation? Can we realistically assume that the best interest of the union member or the best interest of a giant corporation is always the same as the national interest? Surely it is difficult to say yes. No one knows this better than the corporate executive or the union leader. Sometimes the seeming necessity of a wage increase or a price hike begins to look less inflationary as internal pressure mounts.

Consider then what the Administration's policy does. It imposes upon the corporate executive and the union leader demands which they may feel, wisely or unwisely, are basically inconsistent with the legal responsibilities and the institutional obligations imposed upon them by the high offices they hold. This is troublesome. And it must be pointed out that it is entirely different from the government asking the individual to make personal sacrifices for his country. Most individuals do not have a constituency.

In assessing the possible disparity between the public interest, defined by the Administration, and the interest of the union or the corporation, however, it is vital to remember what US Steel forgot; namely, that the corporate executive and union leader must pay attention to the public interest if they are to discharge their responsibilities to those they represent. All decisions by powerful private groups are likely to be scrutinized closely by government. The potential reaction of government, through legislation and the administration and enforcement of existing laws, is a key factor that responsible private decision-makers must take into account before they act if they are to serve the long-run, best interest of those they represent. The

---

HARRY H. WELLINGTON *is professor of law at Yale University Law School.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

difficulty often is to get the private decision-maker to think in these long-run terms. (This point might otherwise be termed the Achilles heel of US Steel.)

Then too the Kennedy-Goldberg policy in some ways tends to penalize friends and help enemies of the Administration. The leaders of the Steelworkers Union may have been prepared to forego a wage increase and take into account the public interest, as defined by the President and his Secretary of Labor, in the demands they made upon the steel companies. It is hardly likely that Mr. Hoffa will pay any attention whatsoever to the public interest similarly defined in the wage demands he makes during collective bargaining. It may be very hard for a labor leader or a corporate executive to stay in office and still take account of the public interest when he faces competition from others who are more willing to adopt a "public be damned" attitude.

Some Constructive Suggestions

The steel situation itself suggests a third question. Presidential prestige is something that should not be over-extended. This is true domestically as well as in international affairs. Each time a difficult and important labor question faces the nation the President should not have to put his prestige on the line. He won in the steel case, but he might not win the next time, and economic stability could hang in the balance.

This leads to a fourth and final question. Mr. Kennedy did what he had to do in the steel situation. And in some ways he was a joy to watch. A champion in action is, after all, an appealing figure. But the total exploitation of governmental power that we witnessed after the announced $6 a ton increase was, on reflection, rather frightening.

It is enormously easier to criticize than to make affirmative suggestions. Some may have hoped that the Report to the President from his Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy would contain important, affirmative suggestions. But that hope went unfulfilled. The Report, published May 1, has "the vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents." Yet the government's role in labor relations must be made effective, orderly, evenhanded. Process must be substituted for *ad hoc* intervention. But how?

It is frequently thought that the law can be brought to bear upon labor-management relations in only two ways: Government can either regulate wages and prices of major industries; or unions and business enterprises can be broken up so that the decision reached by any private individual does not have a sufficient enough impact on the total economy to warrant governmental concern. Both approaches are radical because they would impose major changes on present institutions.

I suggest – in a tentative fashion, for much more study is needed – that it may be possible to work within the framework of the existing institutions and the existing patterns of governmental control. This is not to say that legislation is not necessary. Rather it is to suggest that perhaps the legislation need not be radical in its structure and purpose.

There is a great deal of misunderstanding about the law of labor-management relations. We talk of free collective bargaining. The truth is that the institution of collective bargaining is surrounded and infused with governmental control which goes a long way to shape the collective bargaining contract. Let me give an example. At one time employers took the position in good faith that they had no obligation whatsoever to bargain with a union about the establishment of pension and welfare funds. Unions insisted that this was not so. They asserted that under the National Labor Relations Act employers had an obligation to negotiate with them about these matters. The National Labor Relations Board and the courts held that the unions were correct. The legal imposition of a duty to bargain about pension and welfare funds quickly resulted in more – many more – pension and welfare funds. The decision of the NLRB did not require the establishment of pension and welfare funds. It merely stated that they were subject to negotiation. But once a matter must be negotiated, the course of collective bargaining has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changed. And, in a very real sense it has been changed by governmental fiat.

The procedures that must be followed in collective bargaining also affect the terms of the labor contract itself, and these procedures are regulated to a considerable extent by the government. To illustrate, management under certain circumstances has an obligation to furnish information to the union. Thus, if an employer claims that he cannot afford to give a wage increase, he may be required by the NLRB to give enough financial data to the union to substantiate his contention. The information furnished tends to channel discussion during collective bargaining. In this way it influences the labor contract which is the product of the bargain.

Another instance of governmental regulation of labor-management relations is relevant. In many situations a union may not use peaceful economic force – strikes, picketing, boycotts – in the way it would like. The law forbids secondary boycotts. It strictly limits organization picketing. It empowers the government to enjoin strikes in national emergencies.

None of this governmental regulation, with the possible exception of that dealing with national emergencies strikes, however, is purposefully directed toward carrying out an Administration's economic policies. Thus far government's involvement in the bargaining process – while it has been substantial – has never been directed specifically toward national economic goals.

Might it not be possible to make governmental regulation purposeful in this respect? Assume – as the Administration does – that if we are to avoid inflation, wage and price changes should be tied much more than they now are to productivity increases. Could not the government require the publication of more information pertaining to such increases? At the same time, could not the government require that either party, at the request of the other, negotiate in good faith about the proper influence of this productivity on the setting of wage scales? Such information should relate not only to the particular corporation engaged in negotiating with the union, but also to the industry of which the corporation is a part.

And might not these requirements be coupled with an obligation on the part of each corporation to bargain with the union not only about wage increases, but about the influence of productivity on prices as well? With the government defining the public's goal in terms of a non-inflationary settlement and imposing an obligation on both parties to negotiate about the effect of productivity changes on wages and prices, pressure would be imposed upon the union to seek a wage increase that was no greater than the average productivity increase in the industry. Where the particular firm's increase in productivity was greater than the average prevailing throughout the industry, the union might be expected to press for a lower product price.

Might it not also be possible for the government to determine in a more conscious fashion which fringe benefits must be bargained about if the union so demands, and which benefits the employer may refuse to discuss? The power exists and is exercised presently; but might not the law be changed so that decisions can be made on the basis of which fringe benefits tend to be inflationary and which non-inflationary?

These examples – one might think of a number of others – give no assurance as to how the private parties to a labor negotiation will act. The approach, it is hoped, will assist and channel a decision that is consistent with the public interest. It does not require it, but history suggests that it does make such a result more likely.

A Roving Commission

It may be that additional techniques are nevertheless necessary. Their object should be to impose regular procedures instead of *ad hoc* intervention, to give advance notice, and to call to the attention of the private decision-makers the fact that their long-run interest is consistent with the national interest. To help accomplish this, it might be desirable to establish a tribunal under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor with a roving commission to inquire and give aid and assistance to key negotiations in the economy, and in these negotiations to define in as great detail as possible the government's position.

If the lesson of steel and the suggested procedural and technical amendments to national labor policy do not yield the hoped-for results, additional steps may be necessary. One possibility may be to give the Labor Secretary's tribunal the power to recommend to the Secretary, who in turn would recommend to the President, that certain procedures, similar to the less objectionable procedures invoked by the President in the steel controversy in an *ad hoc* fashion, and without advance notice, be used against a corporation which acts in a fashion that the tribunal, the Secretary, and the President take to be unjustifiably contrary to the public interest. Coupled with this might be a strengthening of the emergency disputes section of the Taft-Hartley Act, multiplying the situations where the government can enjoin union uses of economic force that are contrary to the Administration's economic policies.

These latter suggestions are radical – less so than direct control of wages and prices, but more so than should be needed. The President's behavior in the steel crisis makes plain his view that it is imperative to achieve the goals spelled out in Secretary Goldberg's speech. And that means we have reached the point where collective bargaining must evolve or perish.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MacArthurism

It is a truism that as an intellectual discipline, not as a way of life, the art of war is intelligent preparation to face the past. Any Second Lieutenant that West Point will turn out next month could fight the battle of Gettysburg better than Meade did and much better than Robert E. Lee. However, the chance that a new Meade, or a new Lee will appear among them is roughly equivalent to the chance that the battle of Gettysburg will be fought again.

To a superficial observer it occurs that we may be witnessing at present a brilliant demonstration of the force of this truism in the current psychological preparation for the third world war. The assumption is that any all-out war will be fought with thermonuclear weapons, in complete disregard of the historical fact that no war in modern times has been decided by the weapons the combatants expected to use, which suggests that whatever we may fight with, it will not be atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, or even neutron bombs, but something as novel as the tank was in 1916 and the Panzer Division in 1940.

Two suggestions of what it may be are already known to the public. There is an area of the soil of Maryland on which no civilian foot is allowed to tread, except that of a most carefully-selected scientist. Indeed, no layman in his right mind would care to go there, for it is the modern replacement of Macbeth's blasted heath, a spot on which hell-broths have been bubbling for at least 17 years.

It is officially known as the site of the laboratories and testing ground of the Biological Warfare Service. It is actually the spot where we experiment in the production and handling of more formidable equivalents for, or variants of, many forms of pestilence. Why fight with atomic bombs if we can rain upon our enemy leprosy, syphilis, bubonic plague and infantile paralysis? No reason, except common decency, which is not admissible in time of war.

The other suggestion, being more and more frequently and explicitly discussed by ingenious scientific gentry is an instrumentality called laser, a new word coined by using the initial letters of a scientific appellation that means nothing to a layman. Laser at present seems to be a long step toward, rather than perfection of, the ultimate weapon, the "death ray."

Laser involves the treatment of light, or at least sunlight, in such fashion as to make it an excitant of radiation, with all the effects attendant upon intense radioactivity – explosion, implosion, fantastic heats and speeds, and all the rest. Laser, in short, is the sort of instrument that the science fictioneers describe as a distintegration gun. At present, according to the latest reports, its effective range is very short, but it is said to be able to disintegrate a sheet of steel at 30 feet. Indefinite extension of its range is theoretically possible, and these days what is theoretically possible usually becomes accomplished fact with startling speed.

Against that kind of thing conventional means of defense are, of course, about as effective as an ox-hide shield against an anti-tank gun. When your missile is sunlight, talk of interceptors is the gabble of delirium. When the effect of impact is not detonation but heat that can all but instantly convert your concrete bunker into molten lava, the heavier your fortification, the more certain it is to become your tomb.

If – it is almost, but not quite permissible as yet to say when – laser becomes operational, all thermonuclear weapons will instantly become obsolescent, and soon will be obsolete; and all civil defense measures will go with them. It hasn't happened yet, and it may not happen at all; but if it isn't laser, it will be something else. Whether death is borne on sunlight, or on the wind it is still death; and unless all history is reversed it will be borne by some new agency. Hiroshima belongs to history as certainly as the crossbow. Money spent on defense against the weapons of World War II is probably money thrown away.

The only money that has a chance to be called invested, not squandered, is money spent on the prevention, not on the winning of war. "There is no substitute for victory," said MacArthur, and if he spoke truth we are doomed, for there is no victory in war, and can be none. But MacArthur's words were mere gabble. Peace is a substitute for victory, even the uneasy, precarious peace that we have at present, and there is ample reason to believe that a more stable peace is within the realm of possibility.

But why talk about it? Arming against crossbows, flintlock rifles and atom bombs stimulates the steel industry, and the steel industry, we are told, must have more profits; which would seem to be "the conclusion of the whole matter."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NORTH, ITS LEADERS, THEIR AMBITIONS

Almost no first-hand reporting on Communist North Vietnam has appeared lately in the American press, though the US is now deeply embroiled in the war being waged between Vietnamese Communist guerrillas and forces of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in Saigon. Jean Lacouture, foreign correspondent for Le Monde, *has made four trips to the North since his first visit as Press Attache to General Jacques LeClerc during the Franco-Vietminh negotiations of 1946. He is the only Western, non-Communist newspaperman who has been to Hanoi in the past nine months. Mr Lacouture is co-author with Philippe Devillers of a study of the 1954 Geneva Armistice,* End of A War, *and author of a biography of Ho Chi Minh.*

Inside North Vietnam

Ho Chi Minh Between Peking and Moscow

by Jean Lacouture

Last November 15, years after my first glimpse of the Communists in control at Hanoi, at the time of negotiations between France and the Viet Minh which proclaimed the country's independence, I returned to North Vietnam. During my March, 1946, visit, the government of Ho Chi Minh had been merely provisional. It was a frail coalition, poorly set up, harassed by a dangerous opposition, and, except for Ho Chi Minh himself, composed of unknowns. By contrast, the government which I saw in operation toward the end of 1961 is more firmly in the saddle; it is allied to two of the largest powers in the world, is recognized by some 20 other governments, can henceforth boast an industrial capacity by no means negligible for an "underdeveloped" country, and commands a military strength which is without equal in its part of the world.

If, however, there is one thing in common between the revolutionary coalition of 1946 and the Marxist-Leninist regime of 1961, it is the group of political-military chiefs of staff who have led the Vietnamese Communists from Dien Bien Phu to the Puginier Palace where "Uncle Ho" now resides in place of the succession of 12 French Governors-General formerly in residence there.

When I arrived in Hanoi in 1946, I gave the press service of the Viet Minh a list of the persons whom I wished to interview. There were: Ho Chi Minh; Vo Nguyen Giap, then Minister of the Interior; Pham Van Dong, then Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dang Xuan Khu (alias Truong Chinh), editorial writer for the Viet Minh party organ *(La Republique);* and Tran Huy Lieu, Minister of Information. In November, 1961, I once again submitted a list of the leaders I wished to interview. It was exactly the same as in 1946 except for one person: Tran Huy Lieu, who has probably been dead for about four years and who in any case had been relieved of all significant responsibilities 10 years ago. His name had been replaced by that of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ung Van Khiem.

Probably nowhere else in the world is there another Communist Party which can claim such stability in its top administrative echelons. This is all the more remarkable because perhaps never in history has there been another Marxist-Leninist organization which has been obliged to make two such contradictory and vital decisions as (1) the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1941 to facilitate the constitution of the so-called Viet Minh, or "national front"; and (2) the dissolution of this self-same Viet Minh 10 years later, to permit a return to the doctrine of the so-called Lao Dong, or "class" party (the workers' Party). Besides this, there was the shift from the revolutionary phase of the struggle and the *maquis* period to the responsibilities of government and republican administration – always a hazardous transition for a revolutionary and political-military organization. Whatever risks of disruption may have been entailed by these internal upheavals, it is plainly evident that Ho

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chi Minh has succeeded in keeping all his cohorts together as a tightly-knit nucleus of a cohesive team.

This apparently stable and unified party has, however, experienced some dangerous crises. As early as 1946, when the policy of negotiating an end to the war against the French was up for decision, the Viet Minh was torn by violent dissension; and this broke out anew nine months later, when the question of taking up arms was again on the agenda. The Lao Dong (Workers' Party), too, experienced similar internal conflicts when it was found necessary to accept the partition of Vietnam at Geneva in 1954; and these conflicts broke out again at the time of the disastrous application of agrarian reforms in 1956-57. Yet all these crises have come and gone as though none of the major leaders (with the exception of Truong Chinh, who was held responsible for the rural reform catastrophe and consequently was provisionally retired from 1956 to 1957) had ceased to merit the people's esteem. One has the impression that the various component groups of the Party – the Army, the trade unions and the masses – have maintained better relations with each other than their equivalents in the USSR, Poland, Hungary or even China.

The crises most obvious to foreign observers are those which broke out in 1956 and in 1957, and again in 1960. 1956 marked the failure of agrarian reform and, consequently, the disgrace of Truong Chinh, the powerful Secretary-General of the Party and its most noted doctrinaire. He was forced to relinquish his office to the elderly Ho Chi Minh. The truly remarkable feature of this crisis, however, is that Truong Chinh's retirement was merely a temporary and mild punishment. The leniency shown him was out of all proportion to the mistakes he had made and the unpopularity of the terrible Secretary-General. From this, some observers have concluded that Truong Chinh is so powerful he cannot be dealt with more severely, and that he cannot even be excluded from the Politburo of the Lao Dong itself. Others attribute this comparative immunity to the protective arm of Red China, since Truong Chinh is clearly the leader of the pro-Chinese bloc within the Party. Indeed, he is so little concerned with concealing this allegiance that the war name he chose, Truong Chinh, means "the long march." Finally, there are those who believe that the light penalty meted out to the former Secretary-General stems simply from the personal temperament of Ho Chi Minh, who is opposed to sanguinary solutions of the Stalinist type.

Be this as it may, with the advent of the next crisis in 1957 the roles were reversed. This time, "Uncle Ho" appears to have been publicly humiliated while he was out of the country on a visit to the Soviet Union. The pro-Chinese faction headed by Truong Chinh took advantage, perhaps, of his absence to avenge their disgrace of the preceding year by multiplying expressions of their allegiance to China.

Then, in 1960, a third storm blew up when General Vo Nguyen Giap appears to have been removed. For months it was as though his name had been forgotten; he no longer appeared in public; it will be surprising if his retirement is not soon announced. This eclipse will come about before the end of the year and is generally attributed to the influence of Truong Chinh. The latter has never forgiven Giap for having been the most outspoken critic of the agrarian blunders of 1956, as well as for having been the pro-Russian conqueror of the French at Dien Bien Phu.

But all these various crises ran their course more or less within the family. They did not bring about any significant reshuffling of the party leadership until September, 1960. Not until that date were there any overt manifestations of the personal rivalries or the policy fights of the preceding five years. At the Third Congress of the Lao Dong, held at Hanoi in the presence of important representatives of the Chinese and Soviet parties, these tensions did become visible. After a week of debate, a new Secretary-General was appointed to replace Ho Chi Minh (who had, in fact, only been substituting for Truong Chinh during the latter's suspension from office). The new Secretary-General is Le Duan, a very close comrade of President Ho's, a native of South Vietnam who served for a long while as delegate for the Viet Minh in Cochin China after the Geneva agreements. (Cochin China in the South and Annam or Central Vietnam are governed from Saigon, while Hanoi governs the Tonkin delta and its environs.) The appointment of Le Duan has a dual significance: It means that Ho Chi Minh's hand is still at the helm of the Party; and it means that the reunification of South and North Vietnam is being assigned a role of principal importance.

Another significant decision made by the Third Congress in 1960 was the elimination of General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the avowed rival of Giap, both from the joint chiefs of staff and from political influence. This is additional proof that Ho Chi Minh's friends are still strong, and that Truong Chinh's coterie, despite Peking, is less powerful than was once believed.

Ties to Peking and Moscow

Since September, 1960, the Lao Dong appears to have been pulled in two directions by conflicting policy struggles centering on two main problems: reunifying the two Vietnams, and relations with Moscow and Peking. Contrary to what one might assume, these two problems and the attitudes they engender do not necessarily directly affect each other. The strategy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elected by the opposing protagonists with respect to the problem of South Vietnam and its President, Mr. Diem, is not necessarily controlled by the respective ties of these opposing protagonists to Moscow and/or Peking. In other words, all the "pro-Chinese" are not in favor of a "hard" line toward South Vietnam. The reason for this is that the "nationalistic" interests of Hanoi are quite at variance with the ambitions of the Chinese: the Chinese are not particularly anxious to have a bigger and stronger Vietnam at their doorstep, nor to help that country become capable of playing its own hand in Laos, Cambodia or in Thailand, all of which in the minds of the Peking strategists are "zones of Chinese influence."

The distribution of power at the core of the administrative team of Communist Vietnam is regulated by the status of these two main problems. By the time I had come to Hanoi last year, the various positions had been partially clarified by the Albanian crisis and the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The whole world witnessed Ho Chi Minh's efforts in Moscow to avoid a rupture between the USSR and Albania – which is to say between Moscow and Peking. In so doing, the venerable leader was not simply following the dictates of his conciliatory temperament. He was also doing his utmost to save his country from being put in a most untenable position. For if the heart of North Vietnam (and particularly of Ho and his friends) yearns for Moscow, the country's stomach cannot be satisfied without Peking. China, after all, provides 60 percent of North Vietnam's foreign aid, the vast majority of its foreign experts, and emergency supplies in the event of serious trouble. This is why Hanoi, although it retains a sentimental attachment to Moscow, and although it endeavors to balance China's physical ascendancy over North Vietnamese territory by maintaining close relations with the USSR, cannot afford to have strained relations with Peking. Unless, of course, it wishes to become an Asian Albania, a prospect which is incompatible with its vaulting ambitions.

Thus it was that throughout the October-November, 1961, Sino-Soviet crisis, North Vietnam wavered between pro-Chinese gestures such as an editorial in the *Nhan Dan* (the Party's daily paper), and warm homage to Mr. Khrushchev; between organizing an Albanian exhibit at Hanoi and applauding Soviet proposals with respect to Laos. In all public places of North Vietnam, the customary photograph shows "Uncle Ho" flanked by the two "great allies," with "Mr. K" placed at Ho's right and Mao at his left. However, any effort to provoke comment from a government leader on this relationship elicits only the stock reply, fired back with the dry sharpness of a gun-shot: "These are problems for discussion among Socialists" (bourgeois and Western newspapermen: keep out!).

Whereas for many years, a "soft" line toward South Vietnam had prevailed, assuring the maintenance in the South of a "National Liberation Front" (obviously with a Communist core but with the appearance of a coalition in the manner of the Viet Minh in former times), a more radical strategy was evolved: hence, the creation in Cochin China of a "class party" corresponding to the Lao Dong, the "revolutionary people's party."

Strength of Ho Chi Minh

I was able in November, 1961, to analyze the balance of power in the Lao Dong in relation to the positions taken by various leaders on these two problems of Moscow-Peking relations and South Vietnam.

According to all the evidence, Ho Chi Minh and his adherents have a sizable majority in the Politburo, which is composed of 11 members, five or six of whom have real political influence. These faithful supporters of Ho Chi Minh include Prime Minister Pham Van Dong; the Commander-in-Chief, Vo Nguyen Giap; and the new Secretary-General, Le Duan. The opposing camp is led, as mentioned before, by the pro-Chinese Truong Chinh, whose closest companion is Nguyen Duy Trinh. The Ho Chi Minh group is wary of China. It emphasizes the reuniting of the two Vietnams. It leans toward a Vietnamese "nationalist" policy, looking more or less toward reconstituting, for the benefit of Hanoi, what was once Indochina, in the form once adopted by France for her own benefit. As already stated, this project is most disquieting to Peking.

What at present is the real strength of the old president and his various lieutenants? I had not seen Ho Chi Minh for almost 15 years. Then he was only 57 years old, but he looked over 70; he was visibly wasted by tuberculosis and the excessive use of tobacco, if not opium; yet nevertheless he seemed to me endowed with extraordinary spiritual strength and a flashing intelligence. When I saw him last November, he had become a little, old wise man who scarcely looked his age (72), with fresh color, almost rosy; spry, cheerful and obviously in good health. In spite of the austerity of his life in Hanoi (where he lives in a little hut and eats nothing but rice), it obviously suits him better than the life of a guerrilla fighter.

But although his physical health seemed greatly improved, his mental acuteness seemed to me to have diminished markedly. In fact, throughout the interview he granted me, he was rather vague, talking only of the past, rambling on about this and that like someone in his dotage who remembers what happened 50 years ago better than what happened yesterday.

Could "Uncle Ho" possibly be in his second childhood? He is just shrewd enough to have put on an act,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feigning naïveté so as to dodge any unduly indiscreet questioning about his last trip to Moscow. According to all that I was able to glean in foreign circles in Hanoi – Communist or otherwise – his prestige still remains high and, in times of crisis, his influence is always decisive.

Although he is still Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong no longer appears to have as much influence in the Politiburo as he did 10 years ago. His position today is comparable to that of Chou En-lai in China: he is both the best administrator and the person most knowledgeable in foreign affairs, but he has been accused of being a more or less camouflaged francophile and is very suspect so far as the Chinese are concerned.

These same comments are applicable, to a vastly increased degree, to General Giap. It should even be added that a certain amount of mystery surrounds the personality and career of this conqueror of Dien Bien Phu; Hanoi has taken care not to make a legendary military hero of him, and it is this veil of mystery which has aroused Truong Chinh's personal dislike and the wariness of his Chinese friends. When I requested an interview with Giap during my stay at Hanoi, I was given all kinds of evasive replies. The party did not want Giap to receive a foreign correspondent, and a French one at that.

The Successor to Ho

In view of the veto which Peking would in all probability impose on Pham Van Dong or Giap as a successor to Ho Chi Minh, it would appear that the struggle for the presidency will be limited to two persons: the present Secretary-General, Le Duan, the least anti-Chinese of Ho Chi Minh's lieutenants and who enjoys the further advantage of being a South Vietnamese and hence potentially a symbol of reunification; and his predecessor, Truong Chinh, this son of a Tonkinese mandarin who has become the most intransigent of the Lao Dong's doctrinaires and the undisputed leader of the pro-Chinese faction.

The decision will probably depend on the respective degrees of influence of Moscow and Peking in the capital of Vietnamese Communism when the question of "Uncle Ho's" succession must be faced. Certainly the present Secretary-General will have an ideological majority in the Politburo, but we have already touched upon the extent to which Peking controls the economic life of the country and how it can, by cutting down on its material assistance and withdrawing its experts, exert decisive pressures on the Hanoi leaders.

There is still another card which strengthens the hand of Truong Chinh and the pro-Chinese group. This is the situation in Laos and South Vietnam. In Vientiane, the new pro-neutralist strategy of the Kennedy Administration, and especially of Averell Harriman, has served the cause of "moderates" of the Ho Chi Minh type. But the thwarting of this policy by the Boun Oum and Phoumi clan furnished arguments for the most fanatically anti-American of the Vietnamese Communist leaders, namely, the pro-Chinese faction. Still more weighty than this is the constant reinforcement of US support for Ngo Dinh Diem, symbolized by the appointment of General Harkins to Saigon, and the massive shipment of American equipment and armed divisions south of the 17th Parallel.

The question now arises: Could a more auspicious policy in Laos and a more flexible one in South Vietnam really facilitate the elimination of the Truong Chinh faction and the consolidation of the disciples of the venerable Ho Chi Minh? We lack sufficient solid evidence to substantiate this possibility. It is true that the setting up of a neutralist government in Laos would serve the interests of the more prudent elements at Hanoi. But is the West prepared, in Saigon, to pay the price which Hanoi would ask of it? The North Vietnamese leaders refer only to the doctrine of "peaceful unification," denying stoutly any intention to intervene militarily in the South – which is indeed unlikely. When asked if they propose to absorb South Vietnam, they reply that they only want to have a "democratic" government in Saigon. Democratic in the manner of a "People's Democracy"? No, they say; they want "a government which will respect individual freedom and will be prepared to enter into conversations with us." In short, their goal would appear to be the forming in Saigon of a cabinet whose most eminent members would be "liberals" of no very rigorous convictions, a cabinet into which they, the Northern Communists, would introduce two or three more or less camouflaged representatives. Such a government of their hopes would recognize the legality of the existence in South Vietnam of an organization of Marxist coloration; it would permit cultural exchange with the North (in other words, a channel for Communist propaganda); and it would trade with North Vietnam, particularly the bartering of rice which the Communists need, for machinery which South Vietnam lacks. The West would have to have its own precisely defined political goals in any negotiations with Hanoi.

Is this the easiest way for the Communists to take over South Vietnam? There is a chance that such a strategy will enable them to attain their goal. But what of the alternative? It is by no means certain that keeping a regime like Mr. Diem's in the saddle at Saigon will serve the interests and prestige of the West much better. In the eyes of the Asians the Diem regime symbolizes inefficiency, corruption and a servile attitude toward the West. For my part, I rather suspect that the leaders at Hanoi cherish a secret desire to keep Mr. Diem just where he is.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From Waste to Wonderland

by John Simon

Some people write books; others, palimpsests. Foremost among English palimpsest writers are Joyce, Pound, and Eliot. What are *The Waste Land*, the *Cantos*, *Finnegans Wake* if not layers over layers of literary fragments shored against our ruins – bodies of myth coated with universal history coated with personal experience? To these three names must be added,

In Parenthesis
by David Jones
(Chilmark; $5.75)

though not quite on equal footing, that of David Jones, the Anglo-Welsh painter and writer, whose first work, *In Parenthesis*, is now issued for the first time in America, an even quarter-century after its original publication.

In Parenthesis is the account of seven months with the Welsh Fusileers from the winter of 1915 to the summer of 1916: from the author's enlistment to his getting wounded in the Battle of the Somme. Death, thought E. E. Cummings, is no parenthesis; but the death-in-life of trench warfare, to David Jones, was the most constricting and pointless of parenthetic existences – although a glorious one, too. "For the old authors," Jones writes in his preface, "there appears to have been no such dilemma"; no dilemma, that is, between "the embrace of battle" and "the embrace of a lover." For Jones, the dilemma did exist: he suffered acutely, but the experience of war united him with the world of epic, legend, and myth, which his Welsh temperament embraced with the same mystical glee with which it later espoused Roman Catholicism. Out of this was born *In Parenthesis*, a poetic narrative that interweaves with personal recollections of war, scenes and passages from the *Mabinogion*, the *Morte d'Arthur*, *The Song of Roland*, Anglo-Saxon heroic poems and Icelandic Sagas, the Bible and Jessie Weston, Catholic ritual and *The Golden Bough*.

When Jones started working on *In Parenthesis* in 1928, *The Waste Land* was six years old, the *Cantos* had been appearing at irregular intervals since 1919, and the first installment of *Finnegans Wake* was even then being finished, to appear in print two years later. Jones, a fastidiously snail-like worker, was to spend several years on the 187 pages of *In Parenthesis*, and it was not till 1937 that the book saw publication – for which, it seems, its author never intended it, but yielded, at last, to the pressure of friends.

From Eliot, Jones seems to get, along with certain highly characteristic cadences, the concept of the mythical, historic, and literary parallels, as well as the idea of appending explanatory notes – 34 pages of them – often of a fairly cryptic nature. In one of these he refers to Eliot as "the greatest English poet of our own time," a compliment which Mr. Eliot handsomely repays in his introduction to *In Parenthesis*, which he calls "a work of genius," thereby legitimizing his intellectual offspring. From Pound, Jones derives what I would term "creative archaism": using words from various phases or dialects of the English language in order to incorporate the twin exoticisms of the past and the pastoral. Setting down one's highly personal experiences in a kind of shorthand, and assuming that this will be of universal comprehensibility and significance, is another Poundian trait, as are such mannerisms as the inversion of word order, the frequent omission of articles and auxiliary verbs, and the prodigal use of the ampersand. From Joyce would appear to come the macaronic mingling of languages: Jones inserts a good deal of Welsh and Latin and – it seems almost a language – Cockney; though all this is as nothing compared to the difficulties of his later, longer, and much more demanding "autobiography," *The Anathemata* (1952). From Joyce, also, come the humorous, picaresque, lowbrow figures who become comic or grave counterparts of legendary heroes. Eliot, too, uses this device, but with little or no sympathy for such common types; in Jones, as in Joyce, these characters are treated with gusto and a nice, unsentimental compassion. Indeed, Jones' autobiographical protagonist is named John Ball, like the leader of the 14th-Century Peasants' Revolt. As for the poetic exploitation of the Catholic liturgy, Jones might have gotten this from either Eliot or Joyce (or neither); with Joyce, the fellow Celt, he has in common, at any rate, that "intoxication of style" which Matthew Arnold considered the hallmark of Celtic literature.

After this, one might wonder whether there is any major original contribution left for *In Parenthesis* to make. There is: its very form. For the book, considered a poem by some and a novel by others, is neither; nor is it, like *Finnegans Wake*, an extended prose poem; nor yet is it what medieval literature knew as *prosimetra*, works in which prose and poetry alternate. Still, it is this last form that *In Parenthesis* comes closest to, with one important difference. Here it is not passages of pure prose and pure poetry that jostle each other jarringly, but a highly poetic (even if often slangy) prose that, at appropriate moments, is heightened into extremely free verse. Thus the transitions are neither so ostentatious as to become disturbing, nor so discreet as to disappear altogether. And what could be more apposite for a work that deals both with the chaos of modern warfare and with evocations of ancient, epic heroism than to be *both* novel and poem, each at the proper time. Thus Jones' work fulfills the basic requirement for a work of art: the perfect fusion of idea and expression, the oneness of content and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form. Herewith a typical prose passage ("he" is the enemy, who holds the opposite hill):

> "The other slope was still sun-lighted, but it was getting almost cool on this east-facing hill, and the creeping down and so across so gradually, gathered to itself, minute by minute, the lesser cast-shadows, the little glints and smallnesses, garnered all these accidents of light within a large lengthened calm. Very soon the high ridge-line alone caught cast lateral ray. But for long after, his shrapnel bursts, away beyond, were gauffered at their spreading edges with reflected gold. Across the evening, homing birds, birds of the air with nests cawed on high above them waiting, and the preparation there. Oddly stirred winds gusted coolish to your face, that might have borne things webbed and blind, or the grey owl suddenly. And some people began settling down for the night or at least to snooze before this talked-of bombardment loosed off to make it difficult. Some of them were already fallen to sleep, but the more solicitous disposed themselves and stood about on that hill, and rather tended to speak in undertones as though to not hasten or not disturb, to not activate too soon the immense potential empoweredness – and talk about impending dooms – it fair gets you in the guts."

We can follow the parabola of this prose which curves from the poetic and slightly archaicizing, through the folksy, into the deliberately, anticlimactically plebeian.

Presently, however, there will appear a verse passage such as this, from the description of an infantry charge:

> No one to care there for Aneirin
> Lewis spilled there
> who worshipped his ancestors like a
> Chink
> who sleeps in Arthur's lap
> who saw Olwen-trefoils some moon-
> lighted night
> on precarious slats at Festubert,
> on narrow foothold on le Plantin
> marsh –
> more shaved he is to the bare bone
> than
> Yspaddan Penkawr.
>
> Properly organized chemists
> can let make more riving
> power than ever Twrch Trwyth;
> more blistered he is than painted
> Troy Towers
> and unwholer, limb from limb, than
> any of them fallen at Catraeth
> or on the seaboard-down, by
> Salisbury,
> and no maker to contrive his
> funerary song.

But it is not only in sustained passages of prose and poetry that *In Parenthesis* scales such heights. (The notes, by the way, contain just enough explanatory matter to make the abstruse verse passage almost, but not completely, comprehensible.) Often it is on a single line of poetry or prose that Jones' words impale the very core of being: thus we read of a place "where adolescence walks the shrieking wood"; or hear an injunction to stretcher-bearers, "You mustn't spill the precious fragments, for perhaps these raw bones live." And by provocative couplings of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin elements of our language, by juxtapositions of obsolete words and neologisms, Jones achieves both a feeling of timelessness and a poignant verbal music.

Sometimes, however, the language and rhythms lapse into pastiche. So we get some pure Hopkins:

> "Slime-glisten on the churnings up, fractured earth pilings, heaped on, heaped up waste; overturned for throwings; tottering perpendiculars lean and sway; more leper-trees pitted, rownsepykèd out of nature, cut off in their sap-rising."

Or sheer Joyce:

> "It's twins – and doing well. But let's have it the Marathon kid – cut it out, Mr. Mercury Mystogogue."

Or this, which out-Eliots Eliot:

> Where's the sergeant-major
> I know where he is
> where's the old squire – he's been
> foully murdered
> where's Rosy
> where's Pendragon
> where is his annointed face in
> all time of our necessity . . .

Nevertheless, for the most part, the rich verbiage of *In Parenthesis* envelops – tart, warm, bright – the crisp, spare narrative. It is verbal Welsh rabbit: marvelously creamy and tangy on top, solid and crunchy underneath.

And so the book takes us from the humorous and satirical atmosphere of the early scenes, behind the lines or in dismal but relatively safe trenches, to the final, decimating, nightmarish attack. And throughout, the bygone and the numinous intermingle subtly with the immediate, or rear up menacingly before it: a sudden quaint echo from Geoffrey of Monmouth, the Bible, Herodotus; a sorrowful warning from Shakespeare or the Offices of the Catholic Church; a supernatural terror out of Malory. Jones proceeds in the spirit of the old Celtic tales: you are never sure in them whether you are confronting the quick or the dead; the background is always some nebulous region which turns out to be the Country of Death. So, too, the scenery of *In Parenthesis* shifts bizarrely and brusquely: now it is the Waste Land, now Wonderland. In the end we realize that the two are the same.

But, however irritatingly un-Celtic of me it may be, I am inclined to doubt that *In Parenthesis* is the "work of genius" Mr. Eliot has dubbed it, or the "masterpiece" Mr. Auden has declared it to be. And I doubt even more seriously that the "average reader" will follow Auden's precept: "I would advise him to do as is best to do when reading *The Divine Comedy:* read it first straight through without bothering about allusions he does not 'get,' then a second time consulting the notes, after which, before a third reading, he might well do some homework on his own." Even a *better* reader is more likely to go through the book once, with mingled interest, admiration, and exasperation, and see in it what Frank Kermode called "the sacramentalism of some Roman Catholic aestheticians, like Mr. David Jones." The main difficulty lies in Jones' assumption about army life: "The 'Bugger! Bugger!' of a man detailed, had often about it the 'Fiat! Fiat!' of the Saints." It takes some pretty advanced sacramentalism to accept that particular transubstantiation. Which is why the reminiscences of Robert Graves (in the same fighting and with the same regiment) in prose such as *Good-bye to*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All That and verse like "Recalling War" are ultimately more valid – humanly as well as artistically. As remarkable prose poetry, situated somewhere among Hopkins, Pound, Eliot, Joyce, and Dylan Thomas, *In Parenthesis* deserves honorable mention. But as sustained imaginative recreation and exploration of war, it strikes me rather as the Charge of the Light Brigade did the official French observer: "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

How Not to Run an Invasion

by Richard Dudman

Blunders aside, the invasion of Cuba last year was a classic exercise in pragmatism. Fidel Castro became an affront to the United States, so he had to be destroyed. Some 1,500 Cuban exiles deserved sympathy and help, so they eventually were built into an intended liberation army. The Cubans themselves were disorganized, so the Central Intelligence Agency ran the show. Rightists and even former Batista supporters were easier to organize, so liberals and leftists were squeezed out. And in the end, Administration officials tried briefly to blame the press for the fiasco and then lapsed into silence, almost as if it hadn't occurred.

The Cuban Invasion
by Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer
(Praeger; cloth, $3.95)
(Ballantine; paper, 50 cents)

Tad Szulc of *The New York Times* and Karl E. Meyer of *The Washington Post*, described with considerable accuracy on the cover as "the two reporters who know the story best," relate the whole tragic story in the same pragmatic terms.

The critical and circumstantial account performs the role of the public inquiry that never has been made. President Kennedy himself took full responsibility and thereby closed the door on official discussion of what went wrong and who was to blame. There has been nothing approaching an exhaustive exposure of the blunders and lack of preparedness.

The emphasis in the Szulc-Meyer book is on the blunders. The CIA became infatuated with its own plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it, within the framework of the President's decision against any direct United States military participation. The President dealt a serious blow to an already risky plan by canceling a second air strike against Castro's planes before the invasion. The operation was far too big to have been kept secret.

More fundamentally, there was a total failure to work with the Cuban underground, and the Cubans were treated like stooges, not partners. Instead of relying on the Cuban people as the essential factor in the overthrow of Castro and the establishment of a successor government, the CIA chose to undertake a massive single invasion from the outside, the form of attack that would best enable Castro to rally even wavering supporters.

The authors liken the CIA operation to "a car decked out with flashy accessories – a musical horn, a two-way radio and tailfins three feet high – but lacking a motor." They add: "The motor could not be installed by outside mechanics – the vital missing part was the participation of the Cuban people, in whose name the invasion was being fought." Only Sen. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, comes through as seeing the holes in the plan and speaking out against it. Fulbright's memorandum to President Kennedy, paraphrased in the book, used Sen. Wayne Morse's phrase that the Castro regime is "a thorn in the flesh but not a dagger in the heart" and made an eloquent case that the United States-sponsored invasion would be a disaster whether it failed or succeeded. He advocated a policy of toleration of the Castro regime together with efforts to isolate Castroism from the rest of the hemi-

ADLAI STEVENSON:
"A contribution of substantial importance . . . Most accurately named."

MARQUIS CHILDS:
"A most stimulating contribution to the hard thinking that Americans must do if we are to come through the next phase of the cold war short of disaster."

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY:
"Without fanfare and on a basis of fact, Mr. Wilson obliterates Khrushchev's claim that Communism is 'the wave of the future' . . . A refreshing and responsible study of recent world history."

MAX LERNER:
"Thomas Wilson deflates the myth of an irresistible Soviet wave of the future, and shows from the cold record of the political war why Khrushchev's dreams are troubled ones . . . I urge this book as an antidote to the dream world both of the right-wing Bircher fanatics with their fantasy of total victory, and the left-wing political myopics with their doldrums of inevitable defeat."

FOUR DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS AGREE:

COLD WAR AND COMMON SENSE
by THOMAS W. WILSON, JR.
MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS ONE OF 1962's MOST IMPORTANT BOOKS.

NEW YORK GRAPHIC SOCIETY — At all bookstores $4.95 — GREENWICH, CONNECTICUT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sphere. Fulbright's case was "precisely the argument one would expect the Secretary of State to make in behalf of a department that must consider the manifold implications of a gamble like the invasion."

Blame is parceled out generously, to those who lacked essential background, made stupid or naïve decisions or merely acquiesced by their silence.

Szulc and Meyer also blame the press, but not on the grounds President Kennedy blamed it. They tell of the few advance reports of training camps and other invasion preparations in Florida and Guatemala but accuse most of the press of withholding from the American people circumstances that were already well known to Castro.

For all their dealing out of blame, the authors lean toward historical determinism, partly excusing the CIA as being blinded by its own bureaucracy and showing how difficult it would have been for a new President to say "no," especially after campaign excesses on the subject, also forced by the circumstances.

In the main, however, this is a hard-boiled book about a hard-boiled scheme. As such, it deals only lightly with the moral question involved in the invasion plan. Szulc and Meyer call the invasion a moral failure, as well as a failure of mechanics and imagination, but they make it clear they are talking, not about assisting the (truly democratic) exiles, but only about the way assistance was rendered. Their criticism is that the United States laid itself open to the charge of violating national and international laws but was not willing to go the limit with all-out aid to the invaders; it earned the opprobrium without winning the benefits. They leave the impression that they might have applauded the invasion if it had been successful.

Considering the built-in difficulties of the invasion as planned, the treaties prohibiting overt intervention, Latin American memories of Marine landings, and Castro's great remaining popularity in April 1961, however, they conclude that the United States should have taken a more sophisticated course. It should, they say, have provided discreet help to the Cuban underground – genuinely covert so that it could be officially disclaimed if detected – and wait for history to take its course and eventually overthrow Castro.

The Affluence of Inequality

by Paul Mattick

Economists and sociologists speak of the self-transformation of capitalism into a "socially conscious free market economy," or even a "people's capitalism." To the obvious fact of improved living conditions is added the assertion that there is now a more egalitarian distribution of income. Presumably, this is transforming the prevailing welfare-capitalism into a classless society.

Wealth and Power in America
An Analysis of Social Class
and Income Distribution
by Gabriel Kolko
(Praeger; $4.85)

Gabriel Kolko rejects these widespread theories for their lack of factual verification. What statistical evidence exists shows that in the United States "the basic distribution of income and wealth is essentially the same now as it was in 1939, or even in 1910. Most low-income groups live substantially better today, but even though their real wages have mounted, their percentage of the national income has not changed." As regards poverty, Kolko documents the fact that "over one-third of the nation's households subsist on incomes too meager to provide minimum standards of health and decency."

The ideologically-fostered myth of the increasing equalization of income is largely based on the statistical work of Simon Kuznets (*Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings*), which concerned itself with only the richest five percent of the population and its share of the nation's income. Kuznets found that the income-share of the top one percent and the top five percent of the population has dropped sharply and fairly consistently. Kolko shows both the methodological limitations of Kuznets' analysis and its basic irrelevance with regard to income distribution. His own technique, which divides the nation's population from top to bottom into ten groups, each containing the same number of families and unattached individuals, yields different results. Through the 1950's, "the income of the top tenth was larger than the total for the bottom five income-tenths – about the same relationship existed in 1918 and 1919." Moreover, "while the income share of the richest tenth has remained large and virtually constant over the past half century, the two lowest income-tenths have experienced a sharp decline." The only significant "rises in income distribution have occurred in the second- and third-richest income tenths."

While the data refutes the contention of a significantly egalitarian trend in income distribution, it also disproves the socialist argument that capital accumulation implies the progressive concentration of wealth by way of income distribution. If this distribution has not changed for half a century, then both the critics and the apologists of American capitalism have been wrong.

Taxation has been considered a major instrument for a more equitable income distribution but has, in fact, "been minimal, if not negligible." The extension of the income tax to middle- and low-income classes and regressive state and local taxes has deprived the progressive Federal income tax of its equalitarian function. Neither did welfare-spending out of tax money alter the situation, for it did not raise "the standard of living of the lower income classes above what it would have reached if they had not been subjected to Federal taxation." Tax avoidance has become a primary concern of the highest income classes through innumerable gimmicks such as deferred-compensation plans, profit-sharing trusts, stock options, and expense-accounts. All in all, "inherited wealth and large capital accumulation have not been seriously affected by existing tax laws."

The unequal distribution of incomes is, of course, the result of the prevailing distribution of wealth. In 1953, nine percent at the top of the income groupings owned more than 46 percent of the nation's net private assets. Since World War II, one-tenth of the nation has owned an average of two-thirds of all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is nothing quite like it anywhere else: *Poetry* has had imitators, but has so far survived them all. It is an American Institution. To poetry-readers abroad it is still the magazine to which we look first, to make us aware of whatever new poetic talent appears in the U.S.A. . . ." T. S. ELIOT

A creative instrument in the development of the poetry of our time. . . ." ARCHIBALD MAC LEISH

Without *Poetry* the poem like the wild pigeon would have remained among us no more than an official memory."
WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS

Abnégation et intégrité sont les vertus foncières qui légitiment son éclectisme. Elle remplit, avec ferveur, une fonction qui lui est propre et où il semble bien qu'elle soit irremplaçable. . . ."
ST. JOHN PERSE

Unique among all magazines which have supported poets, in being representative over a great many years of the best, and simply the best, poems being written." STEPHEN SPENDER

Poetry has a tradition unrivalled by any similar journal of our time, and was the first mouthpiece of poems which have turned the course of our literature." VERNON WATKINS

Its vitality is as great, and its usefulness is greater than it has ever been. . . ." ALLEN TATE

POETRY 1018 N. STATE ST., CHICAGO

EDITED BY HENRY RAGO

- *$6 a year, for 12 issues*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liquid assets. Although it is asserted that corporate ownership is no longer confined to the upper classes, as reflected in the increase in the number of shareholders from 6.5 million in 1952 to 12.5 million in 1959, it is hardly ever mentioned that there were 9 to 11 million stockholders in the smaller population of 1930. The growing ownership of stocks by worker pension funds and investment companies supposedly turned 50 million Americans into indirect owners of the corporate structure. But at the end of 1959, the pension funds "owned a mere 3.5 percent of all outstanding stock listed in the New York Stock Exchange."

While it cannot be denied that corporations wield enormous power, it is now asserted that this power benefits public interest as well as that of corporations. Supposedly, there has arisen a division between management and ownership which makes prestige of the firm rather than profitability the main concern of management. Kolko asserts, however, that this assumption is erroneous, for managers and stockholders are virtually one and the same. Whatever their motivations, "the managerial class is the largest single group in the stock-holding population, and a greater proportion of this class owns stock than any other."

What causes the existing concentrated wealth and income also causes the prevailing poverty. There are more than five million unemployed, more than six million on relief, more than two million underpaid agricultural workers, and so forth. Among the men employed in *all* occupations and in *every* industry, 30 percent earned less than $3,000 in 1957. "A sharp inequality exists in the incomes of the major occupational groupings; a difference that is marked not only when earnings of the unskilled, service and farm workers are contrasted to these of the managerial and professional classes, but also when these low incomes are compared to the incomes of the skilled workers." The Negro male's annual medium wage in 1947 was 54 percent of the white's; ten years later, that figure was 1 percent higher. It should not be thought, however, Kolko points out, "that income inequality is primarily a racial problem, for the overwhelming majority of the low-paid are white."

The wages of skilled workers, many of whose wives also work, plus the rise of installment credit since World War II, account to a large extent for the improvement in the nation's standard of living that has induced the mistaken notion of a more democratic income distribution. But even so, the "predominantly prosperous middle-class society is only an image in the minds of isolated academicians." Translated into terms of consumption, income inequality creates a visible class structure that determines the immediate existence as well as the long-range life opportunities of each income class.

It may be thought that consumption has been equalized even though distribution of income has not. That this is not so, Kolko demonstrates convincingly and in great detail with regard to education, housing, health, and actual commodity ownership. Whatever the total consumption of goods of each economic class, the consumption gap between income classes remains very large. No definite program is offered for the alleviation of this situation, for this study serves mainly as a reminder of the need to base social theory on reasonably correct data.

MOVIES

The Devils of Kawalerowicz

Martians must laugh when they hear us talk of the "world" of art, particularly of those arts that involve language. They look down and see a lot of parishes, each one knowing something of a few neighbors, little of others, and nothing of some, each nonetheless uttering universal pronouncements. This condition has been true of literature for centuries; in half a century it has become equally true of films. A sharp example is Poland which, according to all reports, has at present an extraordinarily active and interesting film industry. The Polish State Film School was established in 1949 to train directors, actors, technicians – even critics! Eight production units were formed and are fed by the School. Since 1954 the Poles have been making annually about 25 feature films and over 100 shorts. To my knowledge, only three of the features have had general release here, and a few others have been shown at film societies.

Joan of the Angels?
(Telepix)

As it happens, I had strong dissents about the three features; and the Polish short I saw at Cinema 16, dealing with the reveries of an aged washroom attendant, was more arty than art. But there are serious talents working seriously in Poland, and the idiocy of the distribution gap between countries is underscored once more by the release of Jerzy Kawalerowicz' *Joan of the Angels?*

Kawalerowicz, called the dean of Polish directors, has drawn his film from the same sources as those of Huxley's *Devils of Loudun*, and has changed the locale to Poland. Again a priest is sent by his bishop to perform the rites of exorcism in a convent of nuns who are possessed by devils, but the film compresses and dramatizes the facts. In fact, the priest never met the abbess who, at her devils' behest, accused him of sinning with her; and because he could not confess to a sin he had not committed, his legs were broken slowly, then he was strapped to an iron seat in the Loudun marketplace and was incinerated. In the film he does meet the abbess several times, sees the devils work in her, is moved to love by her anguish and by the power of her devils, eventually kisses her (through bars), and feels the devils leave her and enter him. To keep them within himself and to prevent them from returning to her body, thus to insure her purgation, the distraught priest commits murder, rendering himself damned.

Attendant to this story is a sub-plot about one of the possessed nuns who is persuaded to leave the convent and spend the night with a squire before a promised marriage, who is abandoned and returns wretchedly to the convent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JULES FEIFFER

I DON'T KNOW WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH ME. I'M ALWAYS **READING**.

MY MOTHER SAYS, "LOOK AT LITTLE MISS KNOW-IT-ALL! HER NOSE IS ALWAYS IN A BOOK. YOU'LL NEVER CATCH A FELLA **THAT** WAY!"

MY FATHER SAYS, "WHAT DOES IT GET YOU TO BE A BOOK WORM? YOU'LL ONLY HURT YOUR EYES. YOU'LL FIND OUT WHEN YOU'RE OLDER THESE THINGS AREN'T SO IMPORTANT."

MY TEACHER SAYS, "WELL, MISS BETTER-THAN-THE-REST-OF-US HAS **FINISHED** THE BOOK WHEN SHE WAS ONLY SUPPOSED TO READ UP TO **CHAPTER NINE.** PERHAPS THE REST OF US WHO **AREN'T** SHOW-OFFS CAN **STICK** TO OUR ASSIGNMENT."

I **TRY** TO STOP, BUT IT GETS **WORSE** INSTEAD OF BETTER! I **READ!** I **READ!** I **READ!** NO MATTER **WHAT**, I CAN'T STOP READING!

The Hall Syndicate, Inc.

NEXT YEAR I GO TO HIGH SCHOOL.

©1962 JULES FEIFFER

5-20

MAYBE **THEY** CAN HELP ME.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The outraged faithful and the ostentatiously fair-minded, disregarding such antecedent works as Maeterlinck's *Sister Beatrice* and John Davidson's *Ballad of a Nun*, may protest that this motion picture is blasphemous or, at best, an attempt by a Marxist state to deride the Church. As for blasphemy, the Loudun episode is a matter of fact; as for derision, Kawalerowicz' version relieves the Church of its harsh inquisitional role in the true story. This director and screenwriter has tried, I think, to understand love, compassion, and hell within the boundaries of dogma and the strictures of an existent society. (His film can even be read as a comment on the confines of dogma in contemporary Poland.) At any rate, it is entirely free of that slick modern superiority which takes a fast look at a phenomenon like this and says that all those nuns needed was a bit of you-know-what. Kawalerowicz realizes, as Freud saw and flip Freudians do not see, that sexual satisfaction is the beginning, not the end, of understanding; and that sexual problems must be solved within the framework of the society in which they occur. Asmodeus could be driven from Mother Joan's body only by compassion and sacrifice. If the priest had slept with her, it might – temporarily, anyway – have exorcised Asmodeus, but it would have left the recovered abbess a shattered woman. It would be like telling a 20th-Century man with a hyperdeveloped Oedipal drive that the way to cure it is to obey it.

With sympathy then for the human beings thus tormented, with regard for the ethics of their society, and with concern to examine the conflict between life and dogma as epitomized in this incident, Kawalerowicz has made a film whose every detail reflects strikingly the austerity of its period. The picture is almost literally photographed in black and white without gradations. The white habits of the nuns, the spare wintry countryside, the long bare refectory table and benches in a great stone hall, these help to create the atmosphere of a mortified community living in fear of hellfire, in which the nearby inn is an oasis of sin; a world that considers itself a mere corridor to Judgment. Bergman and Dreyer are the obvious comparisons. Visually, *Joan* does not use the subtleties of *The Seventh Seal* or *Day of Wrath;* it is not a film of suggestive shadows but of knife-edge light and dark. In content, it has less of the earlier works' implied editorial comment; it exists *within* its story.

The performances are uniformly good, but some reservations must be noted. I daresay there is no reason why an abbess should not be as beautiful as Lucynna Winnicka (who is Mrs. Kawalerowicz), but she does seem rather young for the office. Mieczyslaw Voit is moving as the priest but is asked to double as a rabbi whom the priest visits. The result is neither a virtuoso acting display nor material of consequence; the film would be better off without this gratuitous scene. Lastly, numerous shots are held two, three, four seconds too long. The excision of about ten minutes would make the film seem more than ten minutes shorter.

Also, let us hope that the distributor's silly "provocative" question mark will be dropped from the title and that he will revert to the original title, *Mother Joan of the Angels.*

But I want to end positively. This is a film of feeling, insight, and historical texture, fascinating to the eye. It is not easy to forget the strange profane ballet of the white-robed nuns whirling in ecstasy. STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Prefabricated Fantasy in France

Just before dinner in January, this year,
Two Nazi Colonels, left over from insanity,
Came in their leather and iron *sturm und drang* stare
Up the stone steps through the door to the desk
Of the Hotel Sauvage in Tournus, in Burgundy.

The clerk at the bell was forty-nine, a Frenchman who fell
With Gamelin, Paris and France behind the Maginot Line
Into the vitiated air under the Black Forest spell
That loosed the mad to the tune of Goebbels' Wagnerian score.
The Nazi Colonels peered into the unhealed wound of fear,
Now open wide through the clerk's crippled eyes,
And knew the work they'd once begun
Could now much more easily be done.

Our Organization is selling fallout shelters, they said, a convertible type,
Which, until the red fallout comes,
Can be used as gas chambers, if you like.
We are part of a skeleton crew giving demonstrations and taking orders,
And we'll need a suite of rooms for display and public relations.

They tipped the clerk an outlandish amount of awfully new Francs,
Humming the *Horst Wessel Lied* as they went to their spread
With horribly efficient baggage and manicured thanks,
While little ghost children, dug up from the unliberated pits,
Worked their limed and cindered joints all night
To plaster Tournus with beautifully designed posters in tri-color blue,
Showing the shelters neat, structurally true and terribly cheap.

By eight the next night, from trucks that came out of an old nowhere,
Every still living soul in Tournus had his own or one to share.
By eight-thirty everyone was standing by his home away from home
Awaiting the demonstration by the Nazi Colonels over radio-telephone.

At precisely nine, after each man, woman and child was cozily inside,
A little bolt fell beyond their reach on every tight-fitting door,
And since, as yet, there was no fatal fallout,
And they'd contracted for a great deal more,
The Nazi Colonels, by a practiced microphonic storm,
Demonstrated the shelters for real
In their converted chamber form. DONALD L. WEISMANN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECORDS

Mahler, Moderns and Others

The performance of Mahler's Symphony No. 3 by Bernstein with the New York Philharmonic last year – the only one I can recall being given in New York – has now been issued on Columbia M2L-275 and M2S-675. It was in connection with this work that Mahler made his famous statement, "For me 'symphony' means using all the means of available technique to construct a world for myself"; and the means in this instance are the huge orchestra, women's and boys' choruses and vocal soloist, the enormous six-movement structure in which they are employed. But Mahler's employment of his huge orchestra is not the opulent daubing of Strauss; instead it resembles Berlioz's practice in the fastidiousness and precision of its use of now only these few instruments and now only those few to produce textures that are clear even when they are complex. This employment of the orchestra is in fact only part of an entire operation that resembles Berlioz's in being never perfunctory or mechanical: whatever is done by an instrument or an inner voice represents attention, thought, purpose. And this evidence of a mind always working – working, moreover, in unexpected, individual and fascinating ways – holds interest in writing which, even when it is impressive, gets to be long-winded, as in the sublime but 25-minute-long Adagio with which the Symphony No. 3 ends. Moreover, the mere working of Mahler's mind is interesting even in some of the long-winded writing that is unimpressive – the shifting from one thing to another and the attempts at portentous utterance in the 33-minute-long opening movement, the arch writing in the second and third movements. As for the performance, Bernstein's pacing and shaping of the work, the playing of the orchestra, and the singing of the mezzo-soprano Martha Lipton, the Women's Chorus of the Schola Cantorum and the Boys' Choir of the Church of the Transfiguration produce a realization that is outstanding in tonal beauty and expressive effect.

Other unfamiliar and unusual music is provided by Columbia KL-5718 and KS-6318, with another group of the vocal pieces of Gesualdo whose daring and strange harmonic progressions make them some of the most remarkable and affecting music that has come down to us. Like the ones on the earlier Columbia records they are sung well by a small vocal ensemble under Robert Craft; and with them the records offer two moderately interesting instrumental pieces by Gesualdo, one played by E. Power Biggs on the organ, the other by Carol Rosenstiel on the harpsichord, and, finally, Stravinsky's *Monumentum pro Gesualdo*, his masterly instrumental reworking of three madrigals, performed by a recording orchestra under his direction.

Works of three contemporary German composers are on Deutsche Grammophon LPM-18-759 and SLPM-138-759. Most contemporary in idiom is Boris Blacher's *Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird*, performed by Ernst Haefliger and the Drolc Quartet, with vocal writing and a fragmentary instrumental accompaniment that have no expressive relation to the Wallace Stevens poems and no coherent musical sense or other interest in themselves. On the other hand Gottfried von Einem's Piano Concerto Op. 20, played by Gerty Herzog with the Berlin Radio Symphony under Fricsay, offers cleverly effective manipulation of traditional materials. And Werner Egk's Quattro Canzoni, performed by the soprano Irmgard Seefried with the Bavarian State Radio Orchestra under Egk is an early work with none of the extremely unattractive and ineffectual writing that was heard in his more recent opera, *The Inspector General*, which the New York City Opera produced last year; instead popular Italian melodic and rhythmic styles are manipulated in harmonically dissonant and orchestrally elaborate contexts, with results that retain some of the attractiveness of the popular materials and add the attractiveness of some of the treatment they are given.

Schubert's Mass in E-flat – a work of his last year that is unfamiliar to most music-lovers who know the great symphony No. 9 and Quintet Op. 163 – has wonderful writing in his fully developed style. Capitol P- and SP8579 offer an excellent performance in which Leinsdorf conducts the St. Hedwig's Cathedral Choir, the Berlin Philharmonic and Pilar Lorengar, soprano; Betty Allen, contralto; Fritz Wunderlich and Manfred Schmidt, tenors, and Josef Greindl, bass.

As for standard repertory, in his performance of Beethoven's Ninth with the Chicago Symphony, on RCA Victor LM- and LSC-6096, Reiner sets a real *maestoso* tempo for the first movement and keeps it steady with excellent effect, only to break the momentum of the movement with a sudden slowing down at measure 138; and he does the same thing again at measures 158 and 407 of this movement. And similar slowing of tempo produces similar damaging consequences in the two passages of proclamation near the end of the third movement, in the first complete statement of the theme of the finale (on the D in the twelfth and twentieth measures), and at measure 195 of the finale, after the instrumental fugato of the *Alla marcia* section. All this makes the performance unsatisfy-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John Simon *is drama critic of* Theatre Arts *and* The Hudson Review. Richard Dudman *is Washington correspondent of* The St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Paul Mattick *is the author of a study of Marx and Keynes that has just been published in France.*

"WHEN I was one-and-twenty,/Good heavens, how I voted!/Progressives were in favor, and/The Stalinists, promoted./I studied Harold Laski;/I read John Maynard Keynes./The Nation *and* New Masses *were/My favorite magazeynes./All races intermingled in/My melting pot of bliss./(If insecure, the cure was sure:/Psychoanalysis.)/Well, now I'm pushing forty,/And groggy from the gaff./I'm flushing Mrs. Roosevelt/And signing up with YAF!"*

For the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW send 25¢ to Dept. R-6 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPE

An unregimented low-cost trip stressing individual liberty & very wide coverage on & off the beaten path from Scandinavia to Africa. Iron Curtain optional. Unless the standard tour is a 'must' for you, write for details.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Box N — Pasadena, California

LITTLE BLUE BOOKS
2000 Titles — 15c
Free Catalogue
LARSON'S BOOKS
Box 215-A
Cannon Falls, Minn.

SKY TOP SCHOOL AND CAMP
Blue Ridge Mountains
"An American Summerhill"
Staff of human-type people believes in love, freedom, creativity, joy.
George von Hilsheimer, Director
PO Box 1118, Fort Pierce, Florida

CAMPING IN THE MIDWEST
Recreational and intellectual nourishment for the free spirit. Cooperative traditions with Folk Arts programs, work projects, crafts, hiking, Red Cross swim instruction. Unique family and unit camping facilities. 285 acres on Lake Stewart, Michigan. Write to:
CIRCLE PINES CENTER, DELTON, MICHIGAN

CAMP SHOMRIA
Liberty, N. Y.
Creative camping for 10 to 17 year old, co-ed. Emphasis on Secular Judaism, pioneering and work program. Israel kibbutz cooperative values, sports, folk culture, discussions. Study conversational Hebrew. Hashomer Hatzair—112 Fourth Ave., New York 3—GR 3-2420.

SUMMER EMPLOYMENT WANTED, Wisconsin University senior, political philosophy and history major, seeks job in New York City. Available early June. Write Box 30, The New Republic.

S-T-R-E-T-C-H Your Money. Join the circle of Smart Buyers. Buy more for less. Details $1.00.
THE FRONTIER SAVING CLUB
3314 Twentieth Street
Tuskaloosa, Alabama

L'EXPRESS

The leading liberal newspaper in France today.
Send 25c for your sample copy.
Howard Publications
Room 503
1475 Broadway
New York 36, N.Y.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order Money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion).....12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year.....11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year.....10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year..... 9c
Per word 48 times in one contract year..... 8c

NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

ing. The soloists are Phyllis Curtin, Florence Kopleff, John McCollum and Donald Gramm, who sing well except for Miss Curtin's final climb to high B, which lacks the security that is essential to the effect of the passage.

Haydn's Symphonies Nos. 94 *(Surprise)* and 101 *(Clock)* are paced and shaped well by Karl Richter in performances with the superb Berlin Philharmonic on Deutsche Grammophon LPM-18-782 and SLPM-138-782. Regrettably, Richter eliminates the little joke that Haydn carefully wrote into the Trio of the Minuet of No. 101 – the "mistake" of the accompaniment staying in the tonic instead of moving with the melody into the dominant; and the woodwinds are blanketed by the strings in loud passages of the full orchestra.

And Mozart's Symphony K.551 *(Jupiter)* and the exquisite little Symphony K.201 are performed well by Fricsay with the Vienna Symphony on Deutsche Grammophon LPM-18-709 and SLPM-138-709; but some may prefer Klemperer's excellent performances of these two works with the finer Philharmonia Orchestra on Angel 35209.

B. H. HAGGIN

Correspondence

The President and Steel

Sirs:

Professor Reich's piece about the "intimidation" of the steel industry by President Kennedy in *The New Republic* for April 30 and on which others commented last week is calculated to wring tears from a crocodile. He solemnly argues that the President, although he used only legitimate powers and "did not go behind his lawful authority," nevertheless intimidated and coerced the industry to make it "conform to administrative policy," an action for which he should have received "legislative authority." In the same breath Professor Reich admits that the unexpected raise in prices was "ill-considered and inflationary."

I should suppose that the only legislation that Professor Reich had in mind was a law treating the steel industry like a public utility and authorizing price fixing of steel in the same manner that utility rates are fixed. But even if such control might eventually prove necessary, it may be assumed that the President would use every other means to prevent inflationary action before resorting to such an extreme course. What would Professor Reich have done under the circumstances, assuming that another nation-wide spiral of rising prices and wages was in the offing?

Presumably nothing. Professor Reich apparently feels that the President's function is to determine but not to enforce the public good; he should sit on the side lines and watch nature take its course. Professor Reich puts the problem somewhat differently: "Undeniably," he writes, "the President has his own constitutional responsibility to set policy and seek to have it followed." But "he has no right to *force* his economic policies on an unwilling industry *without legislation*" (his emphasis).

The view that a *laissez-faire* President is preferable to a President who conceives his role to be an active one in maintaining the public interest is not new. Professor Reich has no objection to the President's "seeking," presumably by persuasion, to prevent inflation; but he must not get tough or "denounce the companies" or investigate, or subpoena papers, or deny contracts to the higher priced companies, or use "informal channels to put heavy pressure on" them or hold "meetings of high officials to consider further government action." But strong Presidents are tough Presidents; they strike their opponents where they are weak; and, if they are also wise, rally public opinion behind them.

Little has been said about the part of the government's role in collective bargaining that the President's action implements. The Secretary of Labor has given a hint of it, but neither labor nor industry responded with much enthusiasm. Collective bargaining was established to protect labor against the threat of wage competition. But the public is not protected, and only the government can represent it at the bargaining table.

Professor Reich comes to one conclusion that I found fascinating. "Much

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of what Mr. Kennedy accomplished by pressure of government power," he writes, "he will hereafter be able to command by subtlest suggestion." Splendid! And I doubt not that he can be subtle as well as vigorous.

Francis Biddle
Washington, D. C.

Reich Replies to His Critics

Sirs:

I have two general comments on the letters published last week. I think they wrongly gauge the relative power of government, and they completely miss the point of my protest against President Kennedy's specific actions in the steel crisis.

First. During most of this century one of the greatest problems for democracy in the United States has been massed corporate power, typified by steel. When weak and passive governments left this power unrestrained, labor, the consumer and the competitive economic system suffered. Government in the hands of a strong President offered the best means of curbing corporate power and giving labor and the consumer some measure of equal status. Hence today's "liberals" know government as a friend and protector.

Few people seem aware, however, that an immense transformation has taken place. War, crisis, national defense and the ever-increasing needs of a complex society have caused the friend and protector to grow into a monster whose single heedless football can crush innocent and guilty alike. Government now looms gigantically above any business or industry. Benevolent or not, it is the greatest agglomeration of power ever known in the United States.

It is said that the President's victory reveals not the strength of government but the strength of public opinion and the effect of a competitor's decision not to raise prices. I wholly disagree. The victory revealed, among other things, government's astonishing power to *create* public opinion – has any other price or wage rise aroused a comparable clamor? – and to pressure the smaller steel companies to depart from their well-established course of action.

My estimate of government power does not lead me to suggest an attempt to return to a *laissez-faire* economy. In today's world big government is unavoidable, and steel should probably be regulated more, not less. I do suggest that there is a vast difference between the old-fashioned lances with which Theodore Roosevelt challenged the corporate dragon, and President Kennedy's modern arsenal, and President Kennedy must therefore be far more careful to use his power within the boundaries of law.

Second. It is also said that the President used legitimate powers for the purpose of exercising needed leadership. I contend that many of the President's actions were not legitimate; to my previous list I would add the impropriety of employing Chairman Dixon of the FTC, a supposedly independent, quasi-judicial agency, as an arm of the executive. But the real point is that the President was not using his powers as they were intended to be used, as his subsequent peace-making reveals. The antitrust laws were invoked, but not to control competition. Investigations were started, but not to obtain new information. New legislation was suggested, but not for the serious consideration of Congress. Instead, these powers were simply wielded as clubs, and set down again when the leaders of the steel industry shrank back.

Of course the President must lead, as the writers say. I am no advocate of Eisenhower Inertness. But the steel crisis was brought on by the President's *failure* to lead; his failure to offer a plan applicable to all segments of industry and labor; his failure to seek needed legislation; and his resulting attempt to improvise *ad hoc* solutions to the long-term problem of inflation. His planless stopgap sorties into collective bargaining will inevitably continue to generate one crisis after another which neither anger nor demands for sacrifice will solve.

The fact that inflation is bad, like burglary and murder, cannot justify wrongful methods of combating it. We abhor the use of illegal methods to detect and punish crime and I insist that we must also reject the use of intimidation and coercion to combat inflation or any other evil. Misuse of government power is a danger far greater than inflation.

Charles A. Reich
Yale Law School
New Haven, Conn.

Any Book

Out-of-print books located—no matter how old or long out-of-print. Name the book—we'll find it for you! (Title alone is sufficient.) All authors, subjects. Fiction, nonfiction. No obligation.

Books-On-File
Dept. NEW Union City, N.J.

JEUNE
AFRIQUE

The liberal voice of emerging Africa.
Edited in Tunis, in French. Send 25c for your copy.
HOWARD PUBLICATIONS
Room 503, 1475 Broadway, New York 36

INDIVIDUALISTS AND AUTHORS. Introductory offer. $1.00 brings next three issues of "The Answer," a monthly magazine for Individualists. "The Answer," Box 284, Woodstock, New York.

"WILL FORMS"
Two Will Forms and Book on Wills.
$1.00 Complete
National Forms, Box 48313NR
Los Angeles 48, Calif.

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING"
Self-hypnosis. Use your phonograph, recorder. Fascinating, educational. Details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association
Box 24-NR Olympia, Washington

JAPANESE WOODCUT PRINTS
Masterpieces by Sharaku, Hiroshige, Utamaro, Hokusai, etc.
Accurately reproduced by hand-carved woodblocks using exactly the same materials as originals.
Full-scale; museum-authenticated
Illustrated pamphlet listing over 250 titles, $1.00 by airmail, 25c by seamail
Adachi Institute of Woodcut Prints
CPO Box 362
Tokyo, Japan

HAVE YOU OUTGROWN GODS, SAVIORS AND SUPERNATURALISM?
Is all your concern for people? Then you're a HUMANIST! Welcome to AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION; local chapters, publications. Send $1 for three-month trial membership ($5 for year):
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
Dept. NR, Yellow Springs, Ohio

Printed by National Publishing Co., 301 N St., N.E., Washington 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Great Religions of Modern Man

A massive home reference library of the major religions of today's world — their traditions, meaning, and contemporary significance—with extensive selections from their great writings.

Each volume of this comprehensive series, GREAT RELIGIONS OF MODERN MAN, combines extensive selections from the most important religious texts with an introduction, running commentary, and interpretations by a notable authority. Together, the volumes form an indispensable reference shelf, presenting a meaningful panorama of religious beliefs in the modern world.

Here are the significant scriptures from the Torah and the Koran to the New Testament; their rites and rituals, their controversies and traditions; the histories of the great religions, their present, and their future.

All the major aspects of Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism are explored: the central insights, scriptures, moral codes, mythologies, theologies; their social, cultural, and political attitudes, and their structures as social organizations.

The retail price of this extraordinary 6-volume, boxed set is $24.00. Yet you may have it without charge, as a demonstration of the many benefits of membership in The Book Find Club.

6 VOLUMES IN A HANDSOME SLIPCASE / MORE THAN 1,500 PAGES / OVERALL DIMENSIONS 8" x 6⅛" x 5"

BUDDHISM, edited by Richard A. Gard. **Partial Contents:** The Nature and Historical Development of Buddhism • Its Major Schools • The Nature of Existence; Ultimate Freedom, and Wisdom • Life in Buddhist Monasteries • Conceptions of History, Political, and Social Thought

HINDUISM, edited by Louis Renou. **Partial Contents:** Practices, Beliefs, and Rituals • Sects • Attitudes toward Death, Sacrifice, Creation, Transmigration • Castes • Marriage • Indian Society

ISLAM, edited by John Alden Williams. **Partial Contents:** Muhammad the Messenger, Founder, and Legislator • The Duties of the Believer • Ecstatics, Poets, and Dervishes • Rewards and Punishments • Revelation • Moral Commandments • The Law

CATHOLICISM, edited by George Brantl. **Partial Contents:** The Existence, Nature, and Actions of God • Sin and Redemption • The Trinity • The Mass • Asceticism • The Church as Institution • Positions on Education, Morality, Marriage, Church and State

JUDAISM, edited by Arthur Hertzberg. **Partial Contents:** The Messiah • Faith, Community, and Man's Relation to God • Circumcision • The Holiness of the Land, Exile, and Return • Suffering, Death, and Immortality • Rules of Conduct • Marriage, Parents and Children

PROTESTANTISM, edited by J. Leslie Dunstan. **Partial Contents:** The Rise of Protestantism • Church and State • The Industrial Revolution • Modern Liberal and Conservative Issues • The Church of England • Faith and Reason • The Reformation • Evangelism • Missionaries

RETAIL $24.00

Yours

FREE

The important new **Great Religions of Modern Man** and the outstanding books listed below are all recent selections that the Book Find Club has offered its members at substantial savings. You will recognize them as works of current interest and lasting value—solid, readable books that range from social science to the fine arts. And these are only a few from the outstanding list of more than 100 books and records that the Book Find Club will make available to you as a member if you join now.

■ **CONVENIENCE.** Membership in the Book Find Club makes it possible for you to shop for the books you want in the comfort of your own home—enabling you to build your library conveniently and inexpensively. Each month you will receive The Book Find News, containing an authoritative review of the forthcoming selection and descriptions of the many other books available at special member's prices. You need choose **only** the books you want. ■ **AVERAGE SAVINGS OF 40%.** As a member you will regularly enjoy savings of 40% on the books you take. Furthermore, on certain choices your savings will reach and even exceed 50%. Compare the prices of the books listed here. ■ **BONUS BOOKS.** When your initial commitment has been fulfilled, you will be entitled to a free bonus book **of your own choosing** after every third selection that you take ■ Why not take advantage of this extraordinary offer today? And receive **Great Religions of Modern Man** FREE, as an introductory gift with the first selection of your membership.

RECENT BOOK FIND CLUB SELECTIONS

The City in History, Lewis Mumford. Retail $11.50. Member's price $6.95.

The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, edited by Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Dennon. Retail $10.00. Member's price $5.95.

The Children of Sánchez, Oscar Lewis. Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.50.

Catch-22, Joseph Heller; and **The Rising Gorge,** S. J. Perelman. Combined retail price $10.45. Member's price (for both books) $5.95.

Identity and Anxiety: Survival of the Person in Mass Society. A massive compendium of studies by Mead, Mills, Rosenberg, Richards, Gorer, Howe, Jaspers, and many more. Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.95.

The Affluent Society, John Kenneth Galbraith. Retail $5.00. Member's price $3.50.

Beyond the Tragic Vision: The Quest for Identity in the 19th Century, Morse Peckham. Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.95.

Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, Albert Camus; and **The Cuban Story,** Herbert Matthews. A dual selection. Combined retail price $8.50. Member's price (for both books) $5.95.

Images of Man: The Classic Tradition in Sociological Thinking, edited by C. Wright Mills. Penetrating studies of man by Lippmann, Marx, Engels, Veblen, Weber, Spencer and many others. Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.95.

The Muckrakers, edited by Arthur and Lila Weinberg. Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.95.

The American Theatre, Al Hirschfeld. Retail $9.95. Member's price $6.95.

The Politics of Upheaval, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Retail $6.95. Member's price $4.95.

A History of Western Morals, Crane Brinton. Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.50.

Freedom in the Ancient World, Herbert J. Muller. Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.95.

Primitive Mythology, Joseph Campbell. Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.50.

THE BOOK FIND CLUB

c/o THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1244 19th St. N. W., Wash. 6, D. C.

You may enroll and send me FREE with my first selection as a member GREAT RELIGIONS OF MODERN MAN (plus a slight charge for postage and handling.) I agree to buy at least four additional selections—or alternates—*in the next twelve months. When my initial commitment has been fulfilled,* I will be entitled to a **free bonus book** of my own choosing after every third selection that I take. I am to receive each month without charge the **Book Find News** containing an authoritative review of the forthcoming selection and descriptions of all other books available to me at special member's prices. This will enable me to make my own choice: if I do not want the selection announced I can return your form saying "send me nothing" or use it to order another book from the more than 100 current choice titles offered. I may cancel my membership at any time after purchasing the four additional selections or alternates.

First selection.....

Mr.
Mrs.
Miss **Please print full name**

Address.....

City.....**Zone**.....**State**.....

(Same offer and prices in Canada. Address: 105 Bond St., **Toronto 2, Ont.**)

B62-59-1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED